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ABSTRACT 
Jill Powelson: First Year Results Under a New Medicare Advantage Payer-Health System  
Value Based Reimbursement Partnership 
(Under the direction of George Pink) 
 
 Value based reimbursement (VBR), defined as payment for the perceived value of services, is 
increasing as a trend in the U.S. healthcare system. Medicare Advantage contracts often include VBR 
incentives for providers and facilities to meet quality thresholds and manage the cost of care. In this 
context, a large healthcare delivery system located in the southeast U.S. (the System) entered a new 
partnership with an insurance company (the Payer) to form a Medicare Advantage plan with VBR 
incentives. The purpose of this research is to evaluate the impact of the partnership in its first year, 
including specific metrics, and to explore the reasons for the impact, including specific tactics. A 
qualitative case study research method was used, incorporating interviews of key informants from both 
the System and the Payer. 
  Metrics for new patients served and hospital utilization performed better than goal.  Metrics for 
PCP network composition, membership, and gain share did not meet goal. The researcher concluded 
that the one year evaluation period was too brief for a new VBR partnership, due to the number of 
changes required; a 2-3 year evaluation period would have been more suitable. Themes of value 
creation for the System beyond the metrics included: learning about VBR, a competitive advantage, 
learning HCC coding and RAF scores, increasing patient satisfaction, reducing unnecessary PCP visits and 
improving health care access. The tactics identified as having the greatest impact upon the metrics were 
Payer employed extensivists and Payer clinics for high risk patients.    
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Policy implications of this research are: 1) Federal policies should be considered to require 
improved transparency of data between payers and health systems with common patients. 2) If 
Medicare Advantage plans demonstrate superior patient outcomes and lower the cost of care, then 
federal funding to Medicare Advantage should not be reduced. 3) The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation should consider testing payment models which pay primary care providers via 
capitation to determine if it results in improved approaches to caring for patients with traditional 
Medicare.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Issue 
Efforts to reform the U.S. healthcare system and reduce costs have led to an increasing 
emphasis on reimbursement for the perceived value of services as opposed to the volume of services 
(Casto & Forrestal Ch. 1, 2013; Casto & Forrestal Ch. 10, 2013; Porter, 2010). This trend is referred to as 
value based reimbursement (VBR). Synonyms include value based payment or purchasing and outcomes 
based reimbursement, payment or purchasing. All of them are referred to herein as VBR.  
The term “value based” seems to have been in wide use for at least 20 years in a variety of 
industries as diverse as food service and information technology. In healthcare, the landmark 2001 
Institute of Medicine report “Crossing the Quality Chasm” (IOM, 2001) recommended the integration of 
payment policies with quality improvement but did not yet use the term “value based” or VBR. The 
earliest date that the use of the term VBR was identified in healthcare literature was 2005 (Neumann, 
Rosen & Weinstein, 2005), though it may have been in use earlier. Michael Porter, who has written 
several articles about “value” in healthcare, stated that differing stakeholder goals make defining and 
measuring value particularly difficult in the healthcare industry. Porter posited that “value is defined as 
outcomes relative to costs” (2010, p. 2477). The Institute for Healthcare Improvement created the Triple 
Aim framework to illustrate the necessary balance between cost, quality and the patient experience 
(Berwick, Nolan & Whittington, 2008). Consistent with Porter’s definition and elements of the Triple 
Aim, VBR contracts between payers and providers and/or facilities are typically designed with incentives 
to reduce costs and improve quality, including patient outcomes. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 
explicitly included VBR and accelerated the national trend away from fee-for-service reimbursement and 
toward VBR through new incentives and disincentives, including the creation under Medicare of new 
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payment models (e.g., Accountable Care Organizations or ACOs) and penalties for hospitals which fail to 
meet federally defined quality thresholds (111th Congress, 2010). 
Medicare Advantage contracts between payers, providers and facilities often include VBR 
incentives to meet quality thresholds and manage the cost of care. All Medicare Advantage plans receive 
capitated payments from CMS. This capitated payment structure creates greater incentives for Medicare 
Advantage plans to reduce the volume of services through innovation and the use of care coordination 
(Ayanian et al., 2013; CMS, 2016; MedPAC, 2016). The Affordable Care Act authorized bonus payments 
to Medicare Advantage plans for high performance on quality measures (111th Congress, 2010) which 
further incentivized high quality care. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act or “MACRA” 
(114th Congress, 2015) included dramatic changes to how providers are paid, beginning in 2019. It 
contains significant financial incentives for providers to enter into alternative payment models, which 
are a type of VBR. But MACRA had limited impact on Medicare Advantage plans, because CMS is 
prohibited from dictating how Medicare Advantage plans reimburse providers of healthcare services. 
However, MACRA did direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the feasibility of 
incorporating alternative payment models into Medicare Advantage plans. As a result, CMS surveyed 
Medicare Advantage organizations and subsequently reported that most of them have already included 
VBR mechanisms, including alternative payment models, in their provider contracts (CMS, 2016).  
Health care providers and facilities are concerned about transitioning from traditional 
reimbursement to VBR, and with good reason. Success in a VBR environment will require a fundamental 
shift in how care is delivered in order to deliver high quality at a low cost, and failure could result in 
reduced financial sustainability (Bhatt, Forster & Welter, 2015; Eggbeer, Sears & Homer, 2015; 
Kotzbauer & Weeks, 2015; Wagner, 2015).  
In this context, a large healthcare delivery system located in the southeast U.S. (the System) 
entered a new VBR partnership with an insurance company (the Payer) with the intent of offering a new 
Medicare Advantage plan. The System needed an evaluation of the impact of this VBR partnership in its 
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first year (2015) through a review of key metrics and inquiry into how the impact occurred. The purpose 
of this dissertation was to evaluate the impact of the VBR partnership, to explore the reasons for the 
impact, and to develop a plan for change utilizing the results of the research.  
Significance of the Research  
VBR is being incorporated into federal, state and commercial insurance plans. It is increasing in 
frequency as a payment mechanism (Fried & Sherer, 2016). Figure 1 was prepared to represent an 
anticipated downward trend of fee-for-service1 reimbursement as a proportion of total revenue and an 
upward trend of VBR. Prior to the point where the lines intersect, healthcare providers are rewarded 
more for volume. After the lines intersect, they will be rewarded more for reducing cost and improving 
quality. U.S. healthcare providers like the System will attempt to anticipate when the lines will intersect 
in their locale and to be prepared with strategies to maximize VBR.  
Figure 1: General reimbursement trend in the U.S.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Fee-for-service refers to reimbursement from an insurance company to a healthcare provider based on the 
volume of services rendered.   
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Fried and Sherer (2016) state that the trend toward VBR is leading to a convergence of payer 
and provider goals and strategies. They note that more insurers and providers are joining to form ACOs 
and partnerships, like the System and Payer in this study.  
Approximately 31% of Medicare beneficiaries (17 million people) are covered by Medicare 
Advantage plans (MedPAC, 2016). The proportion of beneficiaries covered by Medicare Advantage has 
tripled from 2004 to 2016 (KFF, 2016), due in part to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (McGuire, 
2011). Given the increasing proportion of Medicare Advantage enrollment relative to traditional 
Medicare, the System must participate in Medicare Advantage contracts or risk losing market share.  
AMGA (AMGA.org) is a national medical group and health system member organization where 
the researcher is an employee. An AMGA survey of executives at 55 multi-specialty medical groups and 
60 healthcare systems (total n=115) showed that respondents expected a 20% increase in Medicare 
Advantage VBR mechanisms from 2015 to 2017 (Speed, Stempniewicz, & Couch, 2015). Another survey 
of 626 family medicine physicians by the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) showed that 
33% of respondents are actively pursuing value based payment opportunities (AAFP & Humana, 2015). 
To strategically manage their organizations given these shifting revenue sources, healthcare 
systems need to be able to understand the impact of new risk arrangements. However, there is very 
little in the literature about the impact of VBR contracts on health systems, perhaps because of 
confidentiality concerns.  This research increases our understanding of the impact of VBR contract 
arrangements under Medicare Advantage and factors that affect the impact. 
Background 
Medicare Advantage: Privatized Medicare managed care plans were first authorized in 1997 as 
Part C of Medicare. Other names used to refer to Part C were Medicare+Choice and later, Medicare 
Advantage. One of the stated aims at the time of the program’s creation was to introduce into Medicare 
the efficiency and cost reduction achieved by managed care payers in the commercial insurance sector 
(McGuire, Newhouse & Sinaiko, 2011). However, this aim has not entirely been achieved as expected. 
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While there is some evidence of higher quality under Medicare Advantage compared with traditional 
Medicare (Ayanian et al., 2013; Basu & Mobley, 2007; Basu & Mobley, 2012; Newhouse & McGuire, 
2014), private sector efficiency has not translated into federal cost savings. The cost of the Medicare 
Advantage program to date has exceeded traditional Medicare. Federal reductions in funding for 
Medicare Advantage plans are threatened to be phased in over time, to bring the cost of the program 
closer to traditional Medicare (111th Congress, 2010). This may result in higher beneficiary out-of-pocket 
costs, lower enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans, or risk-shifting from Medicare Advantage payers 
to providers (CMS, 2016; KFF, 2016; McGuire, Newhouse & Sinaiko, 2011). Per CMS’ (2016) report about 
Medicare Advantage and alternative payment models:  
Many MAOs [Medicare Advantage Organizations] reported they would prefer to engage in 
payment models in which the provider assumes full risk…they often enter into contracts with 
providers with the intention of moving those providers into more sophisticated risk-based 
payment arrangements over time, as they become feasible for and acceptable to both parties. 
(p. 28) 
 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) products predominate in Medicare Advantage; two-
thirds of Medicare Advantage policy holders are in HMOs (MedPAC, 2016). Medicare Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO) products were not introduced until 2003 (Basu & Mobley, 2007). Basu and Mobley’s 
(2007) analysis of AHRQ Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project data in four states found that Medicare 
HMO patients were less likely to have preventable hospitalizations than traditional Medicare patients, 
after adjusting for demographics and illness severity. Odds ratios in the 4 states were 0.83 p<0.001; 
0.875 p<0.001; 0.909 p<0.05; 0.982 p=0.4. There is some evidence that Medicare Advantage enrollees 
tend to be healthier than traditional Medicare beneficiaries (Cooper & Trivedi, 2012; Greenwald, Levy & 
Ingber, 2000; Miller, Decker & Parker, 2016) though this imbalance may have improved after more 
sophisticated risk adjustment methods were implemented for CMS payments to Medicare Advantage 
plans in the mid-2000’s (Morrisey et al., 2013; Newhouse & McGuire, 2014).  
Stakeholders: As stated above, the System is a large integrated healthcare delivery organization 
located in the southeast U.S. The System employs physicians and owns hospital facilities. It is in a 
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competitive market with other large healthcare systems. Insurance companies in this area still primarily 
reimburse a fee for services rendered, or “fee-for-service”. Capitated payments are rare in this market. 
However, elements of VBR are increasingly being introduced into insurance contracts, including 
Medicare Advantage contracts. The Payer is an insurance company offering Medicare Advantage plans. 
Both the System and Payer wish to remain blinded in this study. 
Partnership & geographic area: The System and Payer entered a partnership and introduced a 
new Medicare Advantage product. Initially, they have limited the product offering to one county (the 
County) in the System’s market area. They plan to expand to other counties within the state in the 
future. This study was limited to the County.  The System operates one hospital (the Hospital) in the 
County and has multiple employed physician practices there. The Payer opened its own clinics in the 
County to supplement the care of high cost patients and patients at high risk of hospitalization or 
progressing to a more severe stage of disease. The partnership agreement between the System and 
Payer allows for the alignment of financial incentives, in part through a gain share.  
Insurance product: During the study period of calendar year 2015, the VBR partnership had one 
type of offering: a Medicare Advantage HMO plan including Part A, Part B and a Part D prescription 
benefit. Patients had to reside within the County in order to be insured through this Medicare 
Advantage HMO plan.  
Metrics:  Key metrics for the VBR partnership were provided by the Payer and the System, as 
shown in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Metrics for VBR partnership 
 
Metric Definition 
New patients served 
Proportion of the VBR plan members who are “new to the System”, 
meaning they haven’t had a visit to the System in the 18 months prior 
to becoming a member of the plan 
PCP network composition 
Proportion of Primary Care Providers (PCPs) in the plan network who 
are independent (not employed by the System). Independent PCPs are 
in the numerator and total network PCPs are in the denominator. 
Membership 
Number of people enrolled in the plan. This figure is an average of the 
monthly member counts in 2015. Member count fluctuates month to 
month due to members reaching age 65 and changes such as 
enrollment, disenrollment, death, etc. Major changes in membership 
figures also occur during the annual enrollment period.  
Gain share alignment 
When the VBR partnership generates positive earnings, a percent of 
earnings (a gain share) is distributed to the System and to the network 
PCPs. The percentage distribution is defined in the VBR partnership 
contract and is not included here in order to preserve confidentiality. 
 Hospital care delivery  
Approximating the impact of programs aimed at reducing hospital 
utilization through proactive ambulatory initiatives. At the Hospital 
(the only in-network hospital for the VBR partnership’s plan in 2015), 
metrics for plan members are inpatient admits per 1,000 patients, 
average length of stay, and readmission rate.  
 
Note: The VBR partnership performance goals and actual 2015 metric performance are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 4.  
Tactics: The Payer provided a list of major tactics utilized in the VBR partnership.  
  
  
8 
 
Table 2: Tactics used in VBR partnership 
 
Tactic Description 
Payer clinics for high risk patients 
The Payer operates multiple clinics in the County to provide 
supplemental outpatient care for patients at high risk of 
hospitalization or disease progression. Services provided in these 
clinics are not billed; they are free of charge to patients of the 
VBR partnership. 
Payer employed extensivists 
An extensivist is a physician who cares for highly complex 
patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or acute conditions) in a 
clinic and/or inpatient setting. The Payer employs extensivists in 
the County. Their services are not billed; they are provided free 
of charge to patients of the VBR partnership.   
Effective use of technology and 
data 
The Payer uses an enterprise data warehouse to aggregate 
multiple data sources (including claims data). The Payer also has 
predictive analytics to risk stratify patients. Data reports are 
generated regularly and shared with the System and providers. 
Primary care capitation 
The VBR partnership has a capitated payment mechanism for 
primary care services. Expenses like prescription drugs, 
diagnostic tests and lab tests are reimbursed separately from the 
capitation payment.  
Monthly operating committee 
Operations leaders representing both the Payer and the System 
meet monthly to review data and discuss how to improve 
results.  
New financial incentives 
Two financial incentives which the System and PCP providers 
may receive are gain sharing bonuses (also see gain share 
alignment in Table 1) and a fee for coordinating care with the 
Payer clinics.  
Complementary benefit designs 
to support the clinical model 
The Payer provided a list of benefits which were designed to 
help achieve desired patient outcomes. They are: free 
transportation, low cost drug benefit, $0 premium, $ 0 copay for 
PCP and Payer clinic visits, home monitoring, dental care, vision 
care, nutritionist, podiatry, free initial assessment, and the 
extensivists. These benefits are reviewed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
Marketing/word of mouth 
referrals, and other grass roots 
efforts  
Multiple marketing approaches are taken to attract new patients 
and providers. Two examples are: 1) to attract providers, a grass 
roots approach is taken to visit provider clinics and to build 
relationships with providers, and 2) to attract patients during 
open enrollment cycles, plan representatives offer information 
about Medicare Advantage in general and the VBR partnership 
plan in clinic lobbies.  
  
Research Question and Aims 
The research question was, “How well did a new VBR Payer-System partnership perform in its 
first year, and how were its effects realized?”   
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The research aims were:  
Aim 1: To examine the effect of the VBR partnership on key measures of care delivery (hospital 
admission, readmission, and length of stay) and other metrics mutually agreed upon by the System and 
Payer.  
Aim 2: To delineate stakeholder opinion about how the metrics were realized, including VBR 
tactics. 
The metrics of the VBR partnership examined in Aim 1 were compiled by the Payer and 
approved by the System. A total of five metrics were available, with goals and 2015 performance (see 
Tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 4 for additional information). The Payer provided the list of tactics utilized in 
the VBR partnership and reviewed in Aim 2 (see Table 2 above).   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction to the Literature Review Methods 
A literature review was conducted to identify already published articles like this study. It was 
anticipated that the following topics would be well covered in the literature but would not assist in 
answering the dissertation question:  policy pieces about the Medicare Advantage program, including 
federal policy changes and proposals, and what to expect in the future during a shift from volume based 
reimbursement to VBR. These two topics were avoided in the literature review. Instead, the literature 
review was designed to locate publications about the effect of actual Medicare and Medicare Advantage 
VBR contracts with health systems, facilities and providers. In summary, the literature search question 
was, ‘What has been the effect of VBR contracts on health systems for a Medicare or Medicare 
Advantage patient population?’ To align with the research aims, the literature was assessed to 
determine ‘How and why did the effects occur?’ A defined search strategy with inclusion/exclusion 
criteria was formalized and implemented.  
Details of payer contractual arrangements are typically held confidential. The Federal Trade 
Commission, under Title 15 USC §45 (15 C.F.R. §45, 2002), prohibits anti-competitive price fixing 
activities. This regulation has had the effect of discouraging discussion between healthcare 
organizations about their payer contracts. This project offered a rare opportunity to review a VBR 
arrangement with the active cooperation of the insurance company.  
Search Strategy 
Sources: After consulting with a UNC librarian, ProQuest Health Management database and 
PubMed were the primary electronic research databases used to identify relevant literature. A few 
additional articles on the topic were located through other means.  
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Inclusion criteria: The following inclusion criteria were used in the literature search.  
1. Patient populations were primarily older adults who were covered by Medicare or Medicare 
Advantage. 
2. VBR was included.  
3. Geography was limited to the United States, as Medicare and Medicare Advantage were the desired 
populations and VBR may be quite different in international settings because of differences in policy 
and reimbursement approaches.  
4. Only English language articles were included. 
5. Only publications in the last 10 years were included, as health policy has changed significantly in the 
past decade, and earlier publications may not be relevant.   
6. Health systems including hospitals and physicians were addressed in the articles. Articles about 
settings other than health systems (e.g., nursing facilities, community centers, pharmacies) were 
avoided as they would be less informative about the research question and aims.   
7. Case studies were particularly sought, if they met the above inclusion criteria, as they tended to be a 
good fit with the research aims.  
Exclusion criteria: The following exclusion criteria were used in the literature search. 
1. Articles about the Medicare Advantage program or VBR on topics other than the specific search 
questions were excluded. Examples of articles excluded were federal policy changes and proposals, 
opinions, blogs, advice, warnings and predictions.  
2. Books were excluded from the search due to not always being peer reviewed and not being as 
timely given the nature of the rapid changes happening in the VBR space.  
3. Conditions such as cancer and major psychiatric conditions were avoided as they are often managed 
quite differently than chronic diseases associated with a primarily ambulatory, Medicare-age 
population. 
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4. Initiatives which were grant funded were excluded, as they were not reimbursed through VBR. 
However, Medicare demonstration projects were included. 
Key words: With assistance from a UNC librarian, the literature search was conducted in 
ProQuest and PubMed using the following three search concepts in a Boolean approach:  
1. Any of the following: value based, value based, outcomes-based, outcome-based, outcomes based, 
outcome based, risk, payment risk, reimburse, reimbursed, reimbursement, reimbursement 
mechanisms, reimbursement mechanism, health care costs, costs, economic, hospital economics, 
hospital financial management, outcome assessment, quality, health care quality, Accountable Care 
Organization, ACO; 
2. And any of the following: Medicare, Medicare Part C, Medicare Advantage, Medicare HMO, 
Medicare Health Maintenance Organization; 
3. And any of the following: organizational case studies, organizational case study, organization case 
study.  
Based on the key word search for titles and abstracts with these search terms, the literature 
review resulted in 487 titles. 340 titles were from ProQuest and 147 were from PubMed. Titles returned 
by the search were from peer reviewed publications. Also, five articles were added by the researcher 
and a committee member, from prior readings on this topic.  
Study Selection 
Among the 487 titles, 63 were duplicates, leaving 424 unique titles. 94 articles were selected for 
full review based on a combination of title and abstract review. Of the 94 articles, 17 were excluded 
based on the inclusion/exclusion criteria, resulting in 77 articles for review. Including the five articles 
added by others from previous readings, a total of 82 articles were reviewed in detail. Figure 2 is a flow 
chart summarizing the study selection process and results.  
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Figure 2:  Flow chart for study selection  
 
 
Results of Literature Review 
Articles addressing Aim 1: To examine the effect of the VBR partnership on key metrics such as 
measures of care delivery (hospital admission, readmission, and length of stay) and other metrics 
mutually agreed upon by the System and Payer 
 
Information about two of the metrics – gain share alignment and improved hospital care 
delivery – was most common in the articles. Information on three metrics – new patients served, PCP 
network composition and membership – was not present in very many of the articles. (Results are 
presented in the same order as the metrics are listed in Table 1.) 
New patients served: Kuhn and Lehn (2015) discussed the importance of a metric like this to 
their VBR Medicare ACO. “Attracting new members is a foundational theme in Banner’s long-term 
strategy and the new defining metric for our future growth.” (p. 28) They did not provide any specific 
historical figures or goals.  
PCP network composition:  No information about this metric was located in the literature 
review. 
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Membership: “Maximize Medicare risk scores” (2006) described a fully capitated plan with 
8,000 Medicare Advantage patients. The article stated that “enrollment has been climbing slowly, 
though not as dramatically as we had hoped” (p. 85). Claffey et al. (2012) started with a pilot of 750 
patients in a Medicare Advantage provider-payer partnership and mentioned subsequent growth, but 
did not provide specifics. Kuhn and Lehn (2015) described 95% growth in a Medicare Advantage 
provider-payer partnership over a two year period, from 23,000 to 45,000 members. Lee, Dayal and 
Fontaine (2011) mentioned they had 7,200 covered lives but did not mention growth. Steele et al. 
(2010) described growth of a VBR Medicare Advantage plan from 3,100 members to 19,300 – more than 
five-fold – over three years. 
Gain share alignment - Incentives: VBR incentives such as bonuses and gain shares were 
frequently discussed in the articles. Major types of incentives identified in the literature were: per 
member per month (PMPM) bonus, percentage bonus or percentage increase, and a fixed bonus. 
PMPM bonus: Claffey et al. (2012) stated that a PMPM amount (no specifics given) was paid for 
achieving quality and efficiency goals, in addition to usual fee-for-service payments. Patel, Rathjen and 
Rubin (2012) discussed outcome based payments ranging from $0.50-9.00 PMPM depending on the 
level of quality achieved. Brown et al. (2012) described how Medicare paid PMPM fees to providers for 
care coordination of high risk patients, during a demonstration project.  
Percentage bonus or percentage increase: Feder (2011) explained that most doctors were 
eligible to earn an extra 20-30% above their salary if they met certain quality goals. James (2012) 
described how 5-10% of healthcare premiums, equal to $100 million, was distributed as shared savings 
to participating providers. Mechanic et al. (2011) discussed how providers received bonuses up to 10% 
of the overall medical budget for achieving optimal quality measures. “Maximize Medicare risk scores” 
(2006) stated that IPA revenue from five payers increased 13% overall in one year as a result of 
improved HCC coding related to VBR. Vesely (2011) described a bundled payment demonstration project 
which included a 25% per episode reimbursement gain sharing bonus paid to physicians. 
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Fixed bonus amount: Dominik (2008) and Couture and Fisher (2009) described one health 
system’s receipt of the top CMS bonus in 2008, equal to $385,000. Hagland (2007) discussed the receipt 
of $744,000 from the CMS/Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration project at one hospital. 
Vesely (2011) described shared savings of $558,000 from a Medicare demonstration project which was 
passed along to 150 physicians. This innovative program also paid patients approximately $300 each for 
choosing high quality/low cost providers. Coddington (2012) stated that physicians were paid a 
“significant” bonus (no specifics given) by a payer for achieving quality targets as part of a Medicare 
Advantage program. Kautter et al. (2007) and Kuhn and Lehn (2015) mentioned shared savings from a 
Medicare demonstration project and Pioneer ACO, but did not provide any specifics.  
Gain share alignment - Cost reductions: In addition to articles describing financial incentives 
provided by payers, articles were identified which described VBR related cost reductions or 
improvements in efficiency. Cost reductions were a common strategy of VBR arrangements in the 
literature. Most articles focused on reducing the utilization of health services, while a few focused on 
automation of staff tasks. Cost reduction through achieving greater efficiency was another topic.  
Reducing healthcare utilization: Bielaszka-DuVernay (2011b) stated that $1,500 per enrolled 
high risk patient was saved by the second year of their dual eligible, in-home assessment intervention. 
Bush (2012) implied a cost reduction through “hotspotting” of high cost patients and subsequent 
interventions. Diamond (2011) discussed a reduction in medical costs of 22% compared to a historic 
control group, through increased referrals to hospice and reduced inpatient utilization. Feder (2011) 
described several interventions for high risk patients   ̶ comprehensive high risk patient care centers (not 
payer-run), home care team visits, hospitalist program, and telephone support from nurses and social 
workers   ̶ which saved $2 million annually for every 1,000 high risk health plan members. This equated 
to $2,000 per high risk plan member. Leaver (2013) discussed cost savings of $971,246 over 
approximately two years by creating an advanced medical team to provide coordinated outpatient care 
and home care for frequent emergency department users. Lee, Dayal and Fontaine (2011) reduced 
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PMPM costs by 35% (equal to $381,630), through risk stratification to identify high risk patients then 
offering them “medical home” services. Song et al. (2012) described how participation in a new medical 
home contract lowered costs by an average of 2.8% over two years. Spencer (2014) described how one 
medical group reduced the cost of care for patients with diabetes by 15% through hospitalists, a hospital 
based care manager, and home visits for high risk patients. SteelFisher et al. (2011) discussed how they 
reduced delirium, functional decline and falls for hospitalized older adults, and thus saved $800 per 
enrolled patient on the cost of care, through daily orienting communication, therapeutic activities, 
assistance with mobilization, feeding and hydration, and correction of vision and hearing deficits. Tanio 
and Chen (2013) described how they reduced healthcare utilization in a full risk capitation Medicare 
Advantage environment through a number of interventions, including increasing the length and 
frequency of clinic visits, intensive health coaching for high risk patients, and closing gaps in preventive 
care such as screening for colorectal cancer and glaucoma. Williams (2009) described cost reductions in 
inpatient utilization through innovative community strategies like community health workers. For every 
$1.00 spent on community health workers, the health system estimated a $2.50 savings in cost of care. 
 Automation: “CM enhances telemedicine” (2011) quoted up to 13% savings in costs through 
automated home monitoring to identify exacerbations in diabetes, COPD, or heart failure, followed by 
case manager intervention when appropriate. Boast and Potts (2011) reported staff time savings using 
automated and standardized post-surgical hospital discharge instructions, though no specific amount of 
savings was stated. Williams (2012) explained how telehealth use in a rural intensive care setting 
allowed “virtual” intensive care to be provided and thus avoided $30 million in costs over a seven year 
period, due to avoiding patient transfers to other medical facilities. 
Achieving greater efficiency: Birk (2010) reported a 30% reduction in the cost of care on one 
hospital inpatient unit by applying a waste reduction approach (example: reducing lab errors). Gottlieb 
et al. (2010) described improvements in the process and speed of cleaning and readying hospital rooms 
after patient discharge which saved $317,000 annually. Efficiency improvement techniques such as Lean 
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or Six Sigma were mentioned in many more articles in combination with other interventions or 
programs.    
Improved hospital care delivery:  Articles describing the effects of VBR on hospital utilization 
(admissions, readmissions or length of stay) are grouped below by the impact on admissions or 
readmissions, and length of stay. 
Admission or readmission effects: Many articles described several interventions (not just one) 
to prevent admission or readmission. Common themes were improving transitions of care, home visits, 
home monitoring, nursing care management, better discharge instructions and patient education. There 
is considerable overlap between these interventions, so grouping them into themes was challenging. 
When possible, they were grouped by what seemed to be the dominant theme in the article.  
Improving transitions of care: “Critical path network: transition reduced readmission rate” 
(2010) described how one hospital reduced their COPD readmit rate by 16% and reduced the readmit 
rate for combined pneumonia and COPD conditions by 27%, focusing on transitions of care, home visits, 
COPD classes, increased attention to smoking cessation, a new staff position, and order sets. “How do 
they do it?” (2009) discussed how Baylor achieved the lowest heart failure readmission rate in the 
country through a multi-pronged approach including transitions of care, standardized order sets, home 
visits, an outpatient heart failure clinic, physician champions, and transparent reports. “Team targets 
readmission” (2010) described how one hospital reduced their heart failure readmission rate from 30% 
to 17% through more focus on transitions of care, care coordination, and patient and caregiver 
education including classes about heart failure. “Intervention lowers hospital admissions” (2011) 
described a 12.8% reduction in 30-day readmit rates vs. 20% reduction in a control group, through use 
of a transitional care model, new health coach roles, home visits, phone calls, and new patient 
engagement methods. Aston (2010) discusses how one hospital went from a 32% heart failure readmit 
rate to 14% in four months, primarily using calls within two days of discharge. Feder (2011) discussed 
how hospital use declined among high risk patients by 20% over two years due to comprehensive care 
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centers, home visits, hospitalist program, transitions of care, and telephone support. Kuhn and Lehn 
(2015) discussed an 8.9% reduction in overall hospital admissions and a 6% reduction in avoidable 
hospital readmissions primarily due to improved care transitions, during the first year of a Pioneer ACO. 
Home visits: Bielaszka-DuVernay (2011b) described how in-home assessments led to a 38% 
reduction in admissions vs. usual care. “CM in the home” (2011) mentioned a 27% decrease in inpatient 
admissions due to 5-10 home visits per patient, along with palliative care, end-of-life planning, and other 
interventions. Cohen et al. (2012) discussed how home visits, palliative care, telephone support, and 
other strategies resulted in a 19% reduction in hospital days per enrollee and a lower all cause 
readmission rate of 21.1% compared with fee-for-service Medicare patients at 26.7%. Diamond (2011) 
described an ACO-style approach by one major payer, including home visits and clinic based care 
managers, which reduced hospital utilization by 43%. Spencer (2014) discussed a reduction in 
readmissions from 20% to 12% under an ACO which provided home visits. 
Home monitoring: Monitoring of equipment and electronic information signals (usually via 
computer or telephone) was employed to obtain information about patients who are at home. 
Emmerson (2006) discussed home monitoring for patients with heart failure which was associated with 
a reduction in the hospital admission rate to 6.3%, vs. 28% for those without monitoring. “CM enhances 
telemedicine program” (2011) stated that home monitoring of chronically ill patients for potential 
exacerbations, paired with case managers, reduced emergency department visits and hospitalizations by 
about 20%. While other home monitoring programs were described besides these two, none explicitly 
stated that they reduced admissions or readmissions.  
Nursing care management: Huff (2013) discussed a care management program which reduced 
hospital admissions by 42% for 1,300 patients in a Pioneer ACO. Share and Mason (2012) described 
23.8% less hospitalizations under a payer initiated care management program. Steele et al. (2010) 
described how an advanced medical home model with care managers reduced acute admissions by 28% 
annually in a Medicare and Medicare Advantage population with chronic diseases, depression and poly-
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pharmacy. Claffey et al. (2012) described how, in a population of 750 Medicare Advantage patients, care 
management and palliative care/end-of-life planning helped to reduce hospital days per 1,000 patients 
by 50% and led to 45% fewer readmissions. Terrell (2016) described the use of nurse navigators and 
other interventions to reduce hospitalization by 30% in a small group of poly-chronic patients (n=267). 
Brown et al. (2012) identified six approaches by care coordinators which were associated with reduced 
hospitalizations (8-33% reduction across four programs) in high risk patients: frequent in-person 
meetings with patients, occasional in-person meetings with providers, acting as a communication hub 
for providers, delivering evidence-based education to patients, prescription management, and timely 
and comprehensive transitional care post-hospitalization.  
Better discharge instructions: “Project participants reaping the benefits” (2006) described 
interventions including an inpatient RN expediter role and better, more complete discharge instructions, 
resulting in a 12.09% annual reduction in heart failure readmissions. Boast and Potts (2011) explained 
how automated discharge instructions helped a 14 day readmit rate to go from 4.1 per 1,000 outpatient 
procedures to 1.5 per 1,000. 
Patient education: Williams (2009) discussed how one health system used case management 
and patient education to go from approximately 20% heart failure related admissions to approximately 
5%, for a group of 800 patients. Patient education was a common theme in many of the articles, in 
combination with other interventions. 
Length of stay effects: Efficiency improvement programs such as Lean were a common theme in 
reducing length of stay. “Critical path network: interdisciplinary initiative” (2009) described a 2% 
reduction in length of stay, equating to 18,000 hospital days per year, using Lean techniques to identify 
barriers to timely discharge and remove them. Bielaszka-DuVernay (2011a) described a length of stay 
reduction of 10-15% through the application of Lean techniques to several different inpatient processes. 
Gottlieb et al. (2010) reduced length of stay for chest pain by 0.5 days using physician dashboards, 
standard order sets and more efficient hospital room turnover processes. Kuhn and Lehn (2015) 
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discussed a 14.4% reduction in average length of stay during the first year of a Pioneer ACO. MacKenzie 
et al. (2012) described a decline in mean length of stay from 5.3 days to 4.4 days in 3+ years among 
difficult to discharge inpatients. Williams (2009) discussed how one health system reduced their average 
length of stay for a group of 139 hospital “frequent flyers” from 8.2 days to 4.0. Williams (2012) 
described a rural telehealth initiative which reduced length of stay by 25% in the ICU and other hospital 
units, through electronic tele-consultations with intensive care and emergency care specialists.  
Articles addressing Aim 2: To delineate stakeholder opinion about how the metrics were realized, 
including VBR tactics  
Following is a summary of articles which included VBR tactics like those used by the Payer and 
System. These were informative for the logic model.  
High risk clinics:  “How do they do it?” (2009), “Critical path network: project to reduce costs” 
(2010), Aston (2010), Baldwin (2013), Feder (2011), Leaver (2013), Lee, Dayal and Fontaine (2011), and 
Tanio and Chen (2013) describe some type of high risk clinic or medical home. None of these were 
specifically identified as payer run clinics. While some clinics seemed to only have high risk patients, 
others were a component of a larger clinic. Two were identified as focusing on heart failure (“How do 
they do it?”, 2009; Aston, 2010).  
Extensivists and hospitalists: No articles specifically mentioned extensivists, but three articles 
mentioned aggressive use of employed hospitalists to achieve goals like reduced length of stay or 
reduced readmission rates (Coddington, 2012; Feder, 2011; Spencer, 2014). None of the providers in 
these articles seemed to be employed by payers. 
Technology and data: References to the importance of technology and data were included in 
seventeen articles. Themes included various computer based technologies as well as a regional health 
information exchange, predictive modeling, risk stratification, telemedicine, home monitoring, 
technology to create and track metrics, and useful reports (“CM enhances telemedicine program”, 2011; 
“Critical path network: project to reduce costs”, 2010; “Project participants reaping the benefits”, 2006; 
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“Maximize Medicare risk scores”, 2006; “Critical path network: interdisciplinary initiative”, 2009; 
“Transition focus”, 2010; Birk, 2010; Feder, 2011; Gottlieb et al., 2010; Hagland, 2007; James, 2012; Lee, 
Dayal & Fontaine, 2011; Lemon, Oberst & Griffin, 2013; Nugent, 2012; Spencer, 2014; Yesenofski, 
Kromer & Hitchings, 2015). Eijkenaar, Emmert, Scheppach and Schöffski (2013) discussed that data on 
performance being fed back to providers can be effective in pay for performance programs.  
Primary care capitated payments: “Maximize Medicare risk scores” (2006), Baldwin (2011), 
Bielaszka-DuVernay (2011b), Brown et al. (2012), Galles and Handmaker (2016), and Tanio and Chen 
(2013) all included mentions of capitated payments. Tanio and Chen (2013) stated, “Medicare 
Advantage’s capitation model is more favorable to delivery system innovation than traditional fee-for-
service Medicare because it eliminates the process of negotiating reimbursement for cost-reducing 
delivery system innovations.” (p. 1079) 
New financial incentives: VBR financial incentives were described in 22 articles: Baldwin (2013), 
Baldwin (2013b), Claffey et al. (2012), Coddington (2012), Couture and Fisher (2009), Diamond (2011), 
Dominik (2008), Eijkenaar et al. (2013), Feder (2011), Galles and Handmaker (2016), Guglielmo (2008), 
Hagland (2007), James (2012), Jones et al. (2011), Kautter (2007), Kuhn and Lehn (2015), Mechanic et al. 
(2011), Nugent (2012), Patel, Rathjen and Rubin (2012), Pumpian (2012), Raskas et al. (2012), Vesely 
(2011). Incentives were related to meeting cost and quality goals, sharing gains, savings or risk of 
financial loss with a payer, or to help pay for new interventions. Regarding their payer-provider 
partnership, Claffey et al. (2012) discussed how the initial VBR agreement helped the health system to 
“assess the scalability and cost of the care model” as they moved towards adding a shared savings 
component (p. 2076).  
A systematic review of pay for performance programs by Eijkenaar et al. (2013) found that there 
was little evidence that performance improved as bonuses available to providers were increased. 
Eijkenaar et al. mentioned that the frequency of incentive payments may be important to the success of 
pay for performance programs. Within the systematic review, in multiple studies which did not report 
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an effect of pay for performance programs on patients’ health and the cost of care, it was found that 
providers were not aware of the financial incentives.  
Complementary benefit designs: A number of articles contained benefits similar to the VBR 
partnership’s benefits. The following benefits were not found in the literature review: $0 premium, $0 
copay, dental, vision, podiatry, initial assessment, and extensivists.  
Ride program: “Critical path network: project to reduce costs” (2010) described a Medicare 
demonstration program with case managers who (among other tasks) arrange transportation to medical 
appointments. Tanio and Chen (2013) provided van transportation to medical appointments at no 
charge to their patients, under a fully capitated Medicare Advantage plan.  
 Drug benefit: Bush (2012) mentioned help for patients with filling their prescriptions. Williams 
(2009) described a drug subsidy program for low income Medicare beneficiaries, with low or zero 
copayments, deductibles or premiums, and no drug coverage gap. Williams (2012) described a diabetes 
care redesign initiative which could save “multiple millions” of pharmaceutical costs by shifting 30% of 
patients from all brand name drugs to generics.  
 Home monitoring: “CM enhances telemedicine program” (2011) provided home monitoring of 
chronically ill patients for potential exacerbations, paired with case manager support. “Critical path 
network: project to reduce costs” (2010) mentions telemonitoring services for patients with frequent 
emergency department visits.  Emmerson (2006) discussed home telemonitoring visits for patients with 
heart failure.  
 Vision: SteelFisher et al. (2011) describes correction of vision deficits during older adults’ 
hospital stays, in order to avoid delirium and functional decline.  
 Nutrition: Galles and Handmaker (2016) mentioned that dietitians were part of their care 
coordination team.  
 Marketing/word of mouth referrals: In the literature review, no articles specifically mentioned 
marketing or word of mouth referrals as a tactic.  
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Discussion and Implications for Further Research 
The two tables below summarize what is known about VBR from the literature review. In 
general, the articles in this literature review validated the metrics and VBR tactics being used by the 
Payer and System, though there were some notable differences. Most notably, the metrics new patients 
served, PCP network composition, and membership were not well covered in the literature review.  
Table 3: Summary of literature review themes for Aim 1: To examine the effect of the VBR partnership 
on key metrics such as measures of care delivery (hospital admission, readmission, and length of stay) 
and other metrics mutually agreed upon by the System and Payer 
 
Metric Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
New patients 
served 
 1 Kuhn & Lehn (2015) mentioned this was a “defining 
metric” (p.28).  
PCP network 
composition 
 0 No articles located 
Membership  5 A wide range of membership figures was found in 
these five articles, from 750 to 45,000 members. 
Growth was mentioned as “climbing slowly” 
(“Maximize Medicare risk scores”, 2006, p.85), 
increasing 95% over a two year period (Kuhn & 
Lehn, 2015), and increasing more than five-fold 
over three years (Steele et al., 2010). 
Gain share 
alignment-
incentives 
PMPM bonus 3 In two articles, per member per month bonuses 
were paid for achieving quality goals (Claffey et al., 
2012; Patel, Rathjen & Rubin, 2012). Patel et al. 
included the range of $0.50-9.00 PMPM depending 
on the level of quality. In another article, a PMPM 
bonus helped to cover the cost of care coordination 
services (Brown et al., 2012).  
Gain share 
alignment-
incentives 
Percentage 
bonus or 
percentage 
increase 
5 Three of the articles mentioned quality bonuses 
paid to providers. Figures included were 20-30% of 
salary, 25% of reimbursement, and 10% of the 
medical budget (Feder, 2011; Mechanic et al., 2011; 
Vesely, 2011). James (2012) mentioned 5-10% of 
healthcare premiums paid as shared savings, and 
“Maximize Medicare risk scores” (2006) discussed a 
13% percent increase in reimbursement.  
Gain share 
alignment-
incentives 
Fixed bonus 
amount 
7 Six articles discussed one-time bonuses or shared 
savings from various CMS programs. The amounts 
ranged from $385,000 to $744,000 (Dominik, 2008; 
Couture & Fisher, 2009; Hagland, 2007; Vesely, 
2011; Kautter et al., 2007; Kuhn & Lehn, 2015). One 
  
24 
 
Metric Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
article mentioned a payer bonus from a Medicare 
Advantage plan (Coddington, 2012).  
Gain share 
alignment-cost 
reductions 
Improved 
healthcare 
utilization 
11 Six articles described identifying and intervening 
with high risk or high cost patients. Where the 
amount of savings was mentioned, it was $1,500 
and 2,000 annually per high risk patient, and 15% 
and 35%. (Bielaszka-DuVernay, 2011b; Bush, 2012; 
Feder, 2011; Lee, Dayal and Fontaine,2011; 
Spencer,2014; Tanio and Chen, 2013)  
 
Two articles targeted frequent emergency 
department or inpatient utilizers for coordinated 
outpatient care (Leaver, 2013) or community health 
workers (Williams, 2009). Reported savings were 
$971,000 savings over two years, and $2.50 for 
every $1.00 spent, respectively.  
 
Three articles described other interventions: 
referrals to hospice (Diamond, 2011) for a 22% 
reduction in costs; a primary care medical home 
(Song et al., 2012) to reduce costs by 2.8% annually; 
and older adult orientation and engagement while 
hospitalized (SteelFisher et al., 2011) to reduce 
costs by $800 per patient per hospitalization. 
Gain share 
alignment-cost 
reductions 
Automation 3 Two articles described telemedicine or telehealth 
services: for home monitoring, saving up to 13% of 
costs (“CM enhances telemedicine”, 2011) and for 
virtual care in a rural intensive care, saving $30 
million in costs over a seven year period (Williams, 
2012).  
 
One article described the use of automated 
discharge instructions (Boast & Potts, 2011). 
Gain share 
alignment-cost 
reductions 
Achieving 
greater 
efficiency 
2 Articles mentioned: reduction in waste (lab errors), 
resulting in a 30% reduction in costs on one hospital 
unit (Birk, 2010); improved hospital room turnover, 
resulting in $317,000 annual savings (Gottlieb et al., 
2010).  
 Hospital care 
delivery -
admission or 
readmission 
effects 
 
Improving 
transitions of 
care 
7 With improving transitions of care as a common 
theme, four articles reported an absolute reduction 
in readmission rates for pneumonia, heart failure, 
or COPD; reported reductions ranged from 6% to 
27% (“Critical path network: transition reduced 
readmission rate”, 2010); “How do they do it?”, 
2009; “Team targets readmission”, 2010; Aston, 
2010). Three articles described a reduction in 
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Metric Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
hospital admissions; reduction rates of 8.9% in one 
year and 20% over 2 years were stated 
(“Intervention lowers hospital admissions”, 2011; 
Feder, 2011; Kuhn and Lehn, 2015). 
 Hospital care 
delivery -
admission or 
readmission 
effects 
 
Home based 
care 
7 Home visits were often combined with other 
interventions, such as palliative care. Functions 
provided during home visits included assessments 
and care management. Admission reductions 
mentioned in these articles ranged from 19% to 
38% (Bielaszka-DuVernay, 2011b; “CM in the 
home”, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012). One article stated 
a reduction in hospital utilization of 43% (Diamond, 
2011). Another stated an absolute reduction in 
readmissions of 8% (Spencer, 2014). 
 
Monitoring chronically ill patients at home via 
computer or telephone helped to reduce hospital 
admissions by 75% compared with a control group 
(Emmerson, 2006) and by 20% compared with pre-
intervention admissions (“CM enhances 
telemedicine program”, 2011). 
 Hospital care 
delivery -
admission or 
readmission 
effects 
Nursing care 
management 
6 A nursing care management intervention tended to 
be targeted to specific sub-populations: 
polypharmacy/ polychromic (Steele et al., 2010; 
Terrell, 2016), Medicare/Medicare Advantage 
(Claffey et al., 2012; Huff, 2013), commercial (Share 
& Mason, 2012), high risk (Brown et al., 2012). For 
these smaller sub-populations, admission 
reductions were reported in the range of 23.8% to 
50% annually.  
 Hospital care 
delivery -
admission or 
readmission 
effects 
Better 
discharge 
instructions 
2 Initiatives focused on improving the quality and 
completeness of instructions provided to patients 
prior to hospital discharge. Hospital readmissions 
were reduced by 12.09% annually for patients with 
heart failure (“Project participants reaping the 
benefits”, 2006). A 14-day readmit rate went from 
4.1 to 1.5 per 1,000 procedures (Boast & Potts, 
2011). 
 Hospital care 
delivery -
admission or 
readmission 
effects 
Patient 
education 
1 Patient education was common in many of the 
articles and was most often paired with other 
interventions. In one article, it was the primary 
intervention to reduce heart failure related 
admissions by 75% in a small group of patients 
(Williams, 2009).   
  
26 
 
Metric Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
 Hospital care 
delivery -length 
of stay effects 
Lean, other 
varied 
approaches 
7 Three articles described the use of Lean techniques 
to identify and removes waste within processes, 
barriers to timely discharge were identified and 
removed, helping to achieve a 2% reduction in 
length of stay (18,000 hospital days per year) 
(“Critical path network: interdisciplinary initiative”, 
2009), a 10-15% reduction in length of stay 
(Bielaszka-DuVernay, 2011a), and a 17% reduction 
(MacKenzie et al., 2012). Other approaches were 
more varied (Gottlieb et al., 2010; Kuhn & Lehn, 
2015; Williams, 2009; Williams, 2012). 
 
Table 4: Summary of literature review themes for Aim 2: To delineate stakeholder opinion about how 
the metrics were realized, including VBR tactics 
 
Tactic Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
High risk clinics None were payer run 
 
Standalone or part of a 
larger clinic 
8 Eight articles describe some type of high 
risk clinic or medical home, but none of 
these were specifically identified as 
payer run clinics. Some were standalone 
clinics, while others were part of a larger 
clinic. (“How do they do it?”, 2009; 
“Critical path network: project to reduce 
costs”, 2010; Aston, 2010; Baldwin, 
2013; Feder, 2011; Leaver, 2013; Lee, 
Dayal & Fontaine, 2011; Tanio & Chen, 
2013) 
Extensivists and 
hospitalists 
No extensivists 
 
Hospitalists were 
employed by health 
systems 
3 No articles specifically mentioned 
extensivists, but three articles 
mentioned the use of hospitalists to 
pursue VBR goals. Hospitalists were 
employed by health systems, not payers. 
(Coddington, 2012; Feder, 2011; 
Spencer, 2014).  
Technology and 
data 
Computer systems, 
health information 
exchange, predictive 
modeling, risk 
stratification, 
telemedicine, home 
monitoring, technology 
to create and track 
metrics, and useful 
reports 
17 Seventeen articles mentioned the 
importance of technology and resulting 
data in their VBR strategies. (“CM 
enhances telemedicine program”, 2011; 
“Critical path network: project to reduce 
costs”, 2010; “Project participants 
reaping the benefits”, 2006; “Maximize 
Medicare risk scores”, 2006; “Critical 
path network: interdisciplinary 
initiative”, 2009; “Transition focus”, 
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Tactic Themes (if any) Number 
of 
articles 
Summary 
2010; Birk, 2010; Eijkenaar, Emmert, 
Scheppach & Schöffski, 2013; Feder, 
2011; Gottlieb et al., 2010; Hagland, 
2007; James, 2012; Lee, Dayal & 
Fontaine, 2011; Lemon, Oberst & Griffin, 
2013; Nugent, 2012; Spencer, 2014; 
Yesenofski, Kromer & Hitchings, 2015)  
Primary care 
capitated 
payments 
Helpful source of funds; 
aided innovation 
6 Six articles mentioned primary care 
capitation. (“Maximize Medicare risk 
scores”, 2006; Baldwin, 2011; Bielaszka-
DuVernay, 2011b; Brown et al., 2012; 
Galles & Handmaker, 2016; Tanio & 
Chen, 2013) 
New financial 
incentives 
Incentives for meeting 
cost and quality goals; 
sharing gains, savings or 
risk of financial loss with 
a payer; help pay for new 
interventions 
22 VBR financial incentives were discussed 
in 22 of the articles. Themes are shown 
in the column at left. (Baldwin, 2013; 
Baldwin, 2013b; Claffey et al., 2012; 
Coddington, 2012; Couture & Fisher, 
2009; Diamond, 2011; Dominik, 2008; 
Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Feder, 2011; 
Galles & Handmaker, 2016; Guglielmo, 
2008; Hagland, 2007; James, 2012; Jones 
et al., 2011; Kautter, 2007; Kuhn & Lehn, 
2015; Mechanic et al., 2011; Nugent, 
2012; Patel, Rathjen & Rubin, 2012; 
Pumpian, 2012; Raskas et al., 2012; 
Vesely, 2011) 
Complementary 
benefit designs 
Benefits in the literature: 
Ride program, drug 
benefit, home 
monitoring, vision, 
nutrition 
 
Not found: 0 premium, 0 
copay, dental, vision, 
podiatry, initial 
assessment, extensivists 
9 Nine articles described VBR related 
benefit designs. Only five of the plan 
benefits provided by the Payer were 
located in this literature review (see 
column at left). (“CM enhances 
telemedicine program”, 2011; 
“Critical path network: project to reduce 
costs”, 2010; Bush, 2012; Emmerson, 
2006; 
Galles & Handmaker, 2016; SteelFisher 
et al., 2011; Tanio & Chen, 2013; 
Williams, 2009;  
Williams, 2012) 
Marketing/word 
of mouth 
referrals 
 0 No articles mentioned this as a VBR 
tactic. 
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Some of the metrics and VBR tactics did not appear in the literature. In part, this could be 
attributed to the literature search and the research being from a health system and provider 
perspective, rather than from an insurance company perspective. As more health systems and providers 
enter into payer-like arrangements in the future, more literature may be available from a health system 
perspective. The metric PCP network composition was not located in this literature review, and the 
metric new patients served was only found in one article. Regarding VBR tactics, the high risk clinics run 
by the Payer seem to be somewhat unique; the very few high risk clinics mentioned in the literature did 
not appear to be operated by insurance companies. The Payer employed extensivists and their role also 
seem to be unique. Extensivists were not mentioned in the literature, though hospitalists were. In the 
literature, hospitalists were not stated as employed by payers. The reviewed articles did not include a 
use of marketing and word of mouth referrals as a VBR tactic.  
The metrics which were tracked in various VBR arrangements in the literature generally aligned 
with those of the VBR partnership. There is considerable variation in how metrics are reported in the 
literature, particularly with regard to hospital care delivery metrics. For example, a reduction in hospital 
admissions or readmissions could be reported as a high percentage of a small population, or a small 
percentage of a large population. The period of time over which a reduction in hospital utilization 
occurred varied and sometimes included multiple years. Both absolute and relative reductions in 
hospital utilization were reported. Cost reductions could be reported as a percentage of costs, a per 
patient cost, or in total dollars. These varying factors make it difficult to compare metric figures found in 
the literature review directly to the metric figures used in the VBR partnership.  
The many articles relating to the gain share alignment metric and the VBR tactic new financial 
incentives attest to the importance of financial incentives. However, evidence is mixed about whether 
provider behavior is consistently changed by financial incentives (Eijkenaar et al., 2013). While several 
articles mentioned innovative cost reduction strategies (Leaver 2013; Lee Dayal & Fontaine 2011; Song 
et al. 2012; Spencer 2014; SteelFisher 2011; Williams 2009; Williams 2012), it was not always clear that 
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the cost reduction benefit accrued to providers vs. accruing to payers. Given the growing prevalence of 
VBR and the multiple types of stakeholders involved (including payers, providers/health systems, and 
patients), additional publications about how reductions in healthcare costs are divided or shared among 
stakeholders would be beneficial. It was interesting that Vesely (2011) noted a portion of shared savings 
being distributed to patients under a VBR arrangement.  
Limitations 
VBR is a popular topic in the literature and is mentioned in many articles. The literature review 
was not intended to systematically evaluate the literature about VBR, but rather to inform the logic 
model and methods. Therefore, the search may not have identified every relevant article.  
Case studies were sought in this review. Many of the case studies were authored by health 
system employees writing about their own organization, and the articles could be prone to report 
primarily positive outcomes and downplay any negative outcomes.    
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A Priori Logic Model 
Based on early discussions with the Payer and System and the findings from the literature 
review, a logic model was prepared to show the major VBR tactics, the anticipated directional impact of 
each tactic upon the metrics, and a priori themes about how the tactics worked to impact the metrics. 
The resulting logic model is shown in Figure 3. (A larger version of Figure 3 is included in Appendix D.) 
Figure 3: A priori logic model 
 
On the left side of Figure 3, one can see a list of the major VBR tactics. Descriptions of each 
tactic and metric are included in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, in Chapter 1.  The potential impact of each 
tactic upon the metrics and a priori “how metrics were realized” were developed from preliminary 
discussions with the Payer and System and further informed by the literature review.  
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The logic model was updated as more information became available during the research 
process. An a posteriori logic model is presented in Chapter 5.  
Overview of Research Methods 
A qualitative case study research method incorporating telephone interviews of key informants 
(Creswell, 2014; Patton, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 2012) was used. The key informant interviews were held 
with System and Payer representatives who have knowledge which assisted in answering the research 
question and addressing the aims.  
A preliminary pool of 23 potential key informant interviewees was identified by the System and 
Payer. Key contact people at the Payer and System made initial outreach to the potential interviewees 
to let them know that they would be contacted.  Figure 4 shows that the final number was seventeen 
key informants:  ten from the System, including primary care providers, and seven from the Payer.  
Figure 4:  Flow chart of key informant interviewees 
 
Seventeen one-on-one interviews were held. Each was approximately one hour long, and all 
were conducted by telephone. A standardized interview guide with semi-structured questions was 
developed and reviewed by key contacts at the Payer and System for accuracy of the VBR metrics and 
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tactics. A blinded version of the interview guide was also tested with a fellow student for clarity of the 
questions. See Appendix C for the blinded version of the interview guide. During outreach to potential 
key informant interviewees, a briefing sheet (Appendix B) was provided, along with the interview guide. 
The briefing sheet and interview guide were also attached to electronic calendar invitations sent to each 
interviewee.   
Verbal consent was asked for and received to record each of the 17 interviews. Audio recordings 
were transcribed verbatim into a word processing program. The audio recordings and transcripts have 
been stored securely in password protected electronic format until research is complete. There are no 
printed materials. A code dictionary was created, following the methods described by Saldaña (2016). 
The code dictionary is included in Appendix F. Codes were designed to represent themes and key 
information. The transcripts were coded using ATLAS.ti. The coding process was conducted two full 
times for each transcript, plus additional spot checks, in order to refine the code assignments. The 
researcher was the sole coder. The names of individuals who were interviewed have been kept 
confidential, and a code key has been utilized to enhance confidentiality. Significant quotes have been 
identified in the transcripts, and none of these are identifiable as to the interviewee.   
IRB Approval  
 This research proposal was reviewed by the Office of Human Research Ethics at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and determined to be exempt.  
Research Delimitations 
This research is limited to one insurance plan and one health system. The geographic catchment 
area is one county in the southeastern United States.  The metrics under evaluation were limited to 
those for which figures were provided by the VBR partnership.  
Research Limitations 
The research method used in this study – a qualitative evaluation in a real world setting – 
cannot demonstrate causality. There is no control population, multiple interventions are being pursued 
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simultaneously, and other factors are not held constant in a real world setting. Risk adjustment of the 
VBR population was not attempted due to the complexity of such an undertaking, the lack of detailed 
patient-level information, and the absence of a comparator group. Therefore, the metric results 
described in this study may have been due to factors other than the VBR tactics.  
Figures provided by the Payer and approved by the System were relied upon. Neither the 
System nor the Payer possessed pre-intervention data specific to the VBR patients. Therefore, it was not 
possible to make a pre-VBR/post-VBR comparison except through the use of regional CMS benchmarks. 
Only data for 2015 was provided to the researcher.  
Qualitative research has inherent limitations. The sample size is small by necessity, as it is not 
feasible to interview large numbers of people and analyze the results. The researcher was an active 
participant in the interviews, and the researcher’s perspective influenced how questions were asked and 
therefore how they were answered. Any discussion of what occurred after 2015 was based on key 
informants’ perspectives or opinions, as data after 2015 was not provided to the researcher.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
Research Aim 1: Effect of VBR Partnership on Key Metrics  
Key metrics of the new VBR contract in 2015 were compiled by the Payer and approved by the 
System.  A total of five metrics were available:  new patients served, PCP network composition, 
membership, gain share alignment and hospital care delivery. The metric hospital care delivery was 
further subdivided into three components: inpatient admits per 1,000 patients, inpatient average length 
of stay, and percentage of inpatient readmissions.  
Ultimately, financial performance of the VBR partnership was not able to be included here as a 
metric because the two parties did not reach agreement on the financial performance figures. However, 
the metric gain share alignment is included in this study, and the distribution of a gain share bonus 
depends upon financial profitability. Therefore, an indirect measure of financial performance is included 
via the gain share metric.  
Tables 5 and 6 contain the performance of the metrics compared with goals. These two tables 
were provided to each interviewee as part of the pre-interview briefing sheet (see Appendix B).  
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Table 5: Performance of metrics vs. goals 
  
Metric 2015 Goals1 Description Performance 
New patients 
served 
Significant % of 
members are 
“new to 
System” 
Payer members that are “new to 
System”, meaning they haven’t 
had a visit to System in the 18 
months prior to becoming a 
member of Payer 
Exceeded goal 
PCP network 
composition 
Significant % of 
network PCPs 
are 
independent 
PCPs 
Gain participation from 
independent PCPs to (1) build 
relationships with those PCPs 
with the goal of involving them 
with other value based care 
programs and (2) ensure a 
broader network across the 
County to drive PCP access and 
improve attractiveness of the 
product 
Did not meet goal  
 
Membership x members (# 
redacted for 
blinding) 
Achieve annual membership goal  
 
Shared responsibility of Payer, 
System and another payer2 
Did not meet goal  
 
Gain share 
alignment 
N/A Create gain shares with the PCPs 
and Hospital, allowing them to 
participate in the benefits from 
practicing value based care over 
time 
Gain share in place 
1 The parties evaluate goals annually, and goals in future years may be different.  
2 Another payer is delegated for sales and marketing in the County on behalf of the VBR partnership. 
 
Table 6: Hospital care delivery metrics - performance vs. benchmarks 
  
 
2015 FFS Benchmarks 
(Regional) 
@ 1.0 Risk Score 
Payer 2015 Performance*  
Inpatient Admits per 1,000 Patients 236 Lower than benchmark 
Inpatient Average Length of Stay 5.3 Lower than benchmark** 
Inpatient Readmission Rate % 16.1%*** Lower than benchmark 
*Based on 2015 dates of service claims data  
** LOS at 1 Hospital where Payer had the ability to influence hospitalist processes and inpatient LOS 
***Data based on all 2015 FFS & Medicare Advantage Data; not risk adjusted 
Note: There is one System Hospital in the County. 
 
 Two of the metrics exceeded the 2015 goals or comparative benchmarks. They were new 
patients served and hospital care delivery. Hospital care delivery exceeded the comparative benchmark 
on each of its three components.  Three other metrics did not meet the 2015 goals: PCP network 
composition, membership and gain share alignment. Further, most of the key informants felt that the 
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VBR partnership was advantageous overall to the System in 2015. Each of these metrics is discussed in 
detail below. 
Metric: New patients served: This metric measures the proportion of plan members who are 
new to the System. In this metric, a new patient is defined as someone who has not been seen by the 
System in the 18 months prior to becoming a member of the VBR partnership’s Medicare Advantage 
plan.  
Goal & performance: The goal was set at a significant percentage of members being new to the 
System, and it was exceeded.  
Reaction to metric results: The Payer key informants celebrated exceeding this goal. An 
example is the following comment:  
“…I think the fact that we were able to bring net new members into a System where a lot of their 
utilization was predominantly going to [System], and these are members who had not previously 
used a [System] facility in the last 18 months, is evidence that we were able to deliver on a key 
component of the value proposition in terms of a market share shift.” (Payer comment) 
 
For the most part, the System interviewees also responded positively to this metric result.  
Other comments-Network:  This Medicare Advantage HMO plan utilizes a narrow network of 
providers, with higher member costs for going out of network. Only one hospital was in network in the 
County, and it was the System’s hospital. Patients are strongly incentivized to use the Hospital and to go 
to providers who are part of the plan’s narrow network. This network feature was mentioned by two 
key informants as a contributing factor to meeting this particular metric:  
“…so for [the new patients served metric], I think the biggest thing that affected [it]  was just the 
narrow network and [System] being the primary provider.” (Payer comment) 
“Because our specialist providers are so heavily [name of System network], I think it definitely 
helps drive that particular [metric].” (Payer comment) 
 
Metric: PCP network composition: This measures the proportion of plan network PCPs who are 
“independent”, i.e., not employed by the System. The Payer expressed that their intent is to gain 
participation from independent PCPs, to build relationships with those PCPs with the goal of involving 
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them with other value based care programs, and ensure a broader network across the County to drive 
PCP access and improve attractiveness of the VBR partnership’s Medicare Advantage product.  
Goal & performance: The 2015 goal was that a significant percentage of network PCPs would be 
independent. The actual network composition did not meet the goal.  
 Reaction to metric results: While this goal was not met, a System key informant did note that 
through this VBR partnership, they made progress compared with where they started:  
“So although they didn’t meet the goal initially, you know we really weren’t working in a 
meaningful way around value based care with that many independent PCPs prior to the 
partnership.” (System comment)  
One System key informant pointed out that there are two large PCP groups in the County which 
are missing from the network, which makes it challenging to meet this metric goal as well as the 
membership metric goal. 
Other comments-CIN: It arose in the interviews that the System began a clinical integration 
network (CIN)2 after the VBR partnership began. Some interviewees commented about differences 
between the VBR network and the CIN network. There is an overlap between the two networks, and 
there was commentary about the Payer’s vs. the System’s approach to network development.  
“…even the network, they [Payer] directly contracted with those independent primary care docs. 
We created a clinically integrated network. That was the governance framework for making 
decisions about redesigning care, how to improve quality of care, and that kind of thing, that we 
created, to work directly with our docs. Well, they [Payer] didn’t contract with our [System] CIN, 
they kept contracting, having individualized contracts with these docs, and so it was like their 
relationship with docs wasn’t our relationship with those docs in the context of the CIN.” (System 
comment) 
The Payer’s contrasting viewpoint was that they needed to contract with the independent 
practices in order to achieve network adequacy. 
“We have not been involved with the clinically integrated network at all, and it’s really a lost 
opportunity because [the VBR partnership] came before this [name of CIN]…So when it first 
started out, our network was pretty much the backbone of the network with [System] and its 
                                                          
2 A clinical integration network (CIN) is a group of health care providers linked together by contract and often 
affiliated with a health system. The network may include both independent and employed health care providers. 
Members of the network are typically incentivized toward common quality and cost of care goals. 
  
38 
 
networks, but [System] doesn’t have all of their providers that would fill network adequacy, so it 
kind of just ended up being independent practices that can be part of that network to meet 
adequacy.“ (Payer comment) 
 
Metric: Membership: This metric is the count of members enrolled in the specific Medicare 
Advantage plan which is linked with the VBR partnership. This figure is an average of the monthly 
member counts in 2015. Member count fluctuates month to month due to members reaching age 65 
and changes such as enrollment, disenrollment, death, etc. Major changes in membership figures also 
occur during the annual enrollment period. 
Goal & performance: A goal was set for the initial year (2015) of the new plan, and it was not 
met.  This metric is described as a shared responsibility of the Payer, a local administrator delegated for 
sales and marketing in the County on behalf of the VBR partnership, and the System. Brokers are 
another stakeholder group involved in the sales and enrollment process.  
Reaction to metric results  
HMO vs. PPO: Medicare Advantage HMO plans are common across the U.S.; two-thirds of 
Medicare Advantage policy holders are in HMOs (MedPAC, 2016). However, Medicare Advantage 
participation varies widely by state and county. Several key informants mentioned that this geographic 
area was a difficult location in which to market an HMO plan, and that made it challenging to recruit 
plan members. One System interviewee summed up this difficulty as follows:  
“…we've never really been a strong HMO market in [name of state].” (System comment) 
Payer interviewees had informative comments on this topic as well:  
“It's the seniors who have a lot of money, who have a secondary insurance and are not 
Medicaid-eligible, who didn't like our plan because it requires prior authorization ... they like 
their PPO broad network plan. So, those types of folks weren't as happy, I think, or satisfied or 
weren't selecting our plan.” (Payer comment) 
 
“This is an immature Medicare market, so people really don't understand an HMO pre-
authorization. "Why do I have to do that? I don't want to do that. I want a PPO, where I don't 
have to get authorization." (Payer comment) 
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One interviewee from the Payer commented that progress is being made on how managed care 
products like HMOs are viewed in the County:  
“We didn’t meet the goal, certainly the goal for membership, yet, but the market is now 
changing in that managed care is not looked at with the same antipathy in the market.” (Payer 
comment) 
 
Sales & Marketing: There were several comments from both the System and the Payer about 
challenges with the sales and marketing process for the VBR partnership’s Medicare Advantage plan. A 
third party was delegated sales and marketing responsibilities on behalf of the VBR partnership, and 
there were some complaints about the third party’s effectiveness. Also, brokers are very involved in 
marketing and sales of Medicare Advantage policies, and there were interview comments about the 
brokers not being fully aware of all of the distinguishing features and benefits of the VBR partnership’s 
plan. Some interviewees thought that lack of awareness about plan benefits may have led to missing the 
goals for the membership and PCP network composition metrics. As sales and marketing is a designated 
VBR tactic for this study, these themes are covered in more detail in Table 18 below.  
Other comments: Two Payer interviewees offered their insights on the effect of the VBR 
partnership narrow network upon member enrollment. 
“I would say that when a member walks in to choose a plan, the first thing they ask is, "Is my 
doctor in-network?" Both a primary care doctor, and depending on their disease, their specialist. 
"Are they in-network?" That's the first thing they ask. The second thing they look at is, "Are my 
drugs covered?" What's the formulary? Third thing they ask is what's the premium, and is there 
a copay? I think that of those three, the first one, a network, the first year, was very narrow. We 
had primarily [System] docs. We had some independents, but not a lot, and we had [System] 
Hospital…That was probably the thing that ... If anything held us back, it was probably what held 
us back the most.” (Payer comment)  
 
Some key informants noted that there was further enrollment growth in later years. Two key 
informants noted that growth in membership brings other challenges.  
“I think, as you scale your very personal, high touch, kind of TLC that we’re giving patients at 
home, in the care centers, by the remote monitoring…all of that. As you scale, you have to figure 
out how to maintain that high touch…Growth fixes a lot of things, but I think as the growth 
happens, there are growing pains. Meaning, more sick patients, and figuring out how to scale all 
the pieces to the size they need to be.“ (Payer comment) 
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“For the [current number of] people, this may be effective, but if they get up to 10,000 then I'm 
not sure … they may need to add to this, depending on the types of patients they're seeing.” 
(System comment) 
 
Metric: Gain share alignment: Gain share is the VBR partnership’s term for a financial incentive 
or bonus equal to a percentage of any positive operating margin (excess revenue after expenses are 
deducted) resulting from the partnership. Medical expenses include services provided in inpatient and 
outpatient settings, drug costs, the Payer clinics, extensivists, and other costs related to member 
benefits and operations within the County. When the VBR partnership generates positive earnings, a 
gain share is distributed to the System and to the network PCPs. The percentage distribution is defined 
in the VBR partnership contract and is not included here in order to preserve confidentiality. The Payer 
conveyed that their intent is to “create gain shares with the PCPs and the Hospital, allowing them to 
participate in the benefits from practicing value based care over time.”  
Goal & performance: There was no stated goal for this metric. There was no gain share 
distributed in 2015 as the VBR partnership was not profitable.  
The gain share provides an upside opportunity or bonus if there is a positive margin. A Payer key 
informant offered a comment about this:  
“The intent behind the gain share was always to keep us fully aligned in order [for the System] to 
earn into some of the upside.” (Payer comment) 
 
Reaction to metric results: While several interviewees expressed disappointment about not 
realizing a gain share, some representing both the Payer and the System said that it was not expected in 
year one of the VBR partnership. Relevant key informant comments are shown below:  
“…it’s not unusual for the gain share to take two to three years to start kicking in, typically three, 
especially if the RAF3 is as low as it was in this market.” (Payer comment) 
 
“…there is no gain share actual distribution, and I think part of that is a function of this being a 
new venture so it takes a few years, really, to start hitting on all cylinders and to be operating 
effectively, and it takes time for providers to learn competencies and how they need to practice 
differently to be successful.” (System comment) 
 
                                                          
3 Primarily used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) is a method of 
adapting reimbursement to account for the number and severity of patient diseases or conditions. (CMS, 2017) 
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 Metric: Hospital care delivery: Three measures of hospital care delivery were included in the 
metrics, for the one System Hospital which is located in the County:  inpatient admits per 1,000 patients, 
inpatient average length of stay, and inpatient readmission rate. Comparative data from the Payer was 
compiled in 2017 based on adjudicated claims with calendar year 2015 dates of service. For the baseline 
or pre-2015 figures, hospital utilization data for the specific plan members was not available. Therefore, 
the parties agreed to compare actual data for the VBR partnership to 2015 Medicare fee-for-service 
regional benchmarks at a 1.0 (average) risk score.  
Goals & performance: As shown in Table 6, actual 2015 performance was better than same year 
CMS fee-for-service benchmarks on all three measures.  
Some interviewees commented on other Hospital initiatives – apart from the VBR tactics – to 
reduce length of stay and readmission rates, which may have also had an impact on the metrics for 
these patients.   
“I think that there may have been some [other] efforts at [Hospital] around that time to improve 
length of stay... And that could have had an impact on the length of stay, but 2015 might have 
been a little early for that kind of phenomenon to really be hitting...” (System comment)  
 
“It’s hard to say if that’s all because of [Payer]. I think there is a lot more emphasis on keeping 
patients out of the hospital and really paying attention to length of stay. I think part of it is the 
better awareness on the part of the providers here, too.” (System comment)  
 
“…in general, the System has just been more focused on cost containment and quality measures, 
and shared savings plans have all kind of rolled out at once the past couple of years.” (System 
comment) 
 
Reaction to metric results: For the most part, reactions were quite positive to the hospital care 
delivery metrics.  
“Admissions exceeded expectations, length of stay exceeds expectations, the readmission rate 
exceeded expectations. Those things all performed very, very well in year one.” (System 
comment) 
 
“…while we're managing those bed days down and allow [Hospital] and [System] to have other 
patients and admissions into [the Hospital], especially when having admissions is a problem 
because everybody is at full capacity. I think that is also a good value proposition for the 
relationship.” (Payer comment) 
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One interviewee commented about how they have learned from the Payer about how to 
improve hospital care delivery, and that it has benefited other populations.  
“I do know that we've seen a reduction in length of stay at [Hospital]. And I do think that is at 
least indirectly… attributable to what we've done with [Payer]. And probably some of the things 
that we've done with [Payer], we've applied to other populations.” (System comment) 
 
A few interviewees expressed alternative explanations for why the hospital care delivery metric 
was lower in 2015 for the plan members.  
“They haven't quite reached the membership they want, so their panel size is a little bit smaller 
than they'd like so, you know, they're able to kind of focus a lot heavier on those patients than if 
they had a larger panel size. I don't want to say it’s easier for them, but, you know, it's a little bit 
less overall work because the panel is not as big as they want, so they're really able to hone in on 
the patients they do have.” (System comment) 
 
 “…another mitigating factor could be that a lot of the independent physicians they're working 
with were already part of a Medicare ACO for a couple years leading up to this, and so have been 
exposed to how to think about utilization and cost in care management, so they probably got 
some lift from some of the independent physicians they were working with at the outset.” 
(System comment)  
 
There was discussion about the inpatient admits metric being lowered through careful 
management of inpatient vs. observation status by the Payer employed extensivist physicians.  
Other comments–Differences in members’ health: Respondents were asked how they thought 
the health of the patients covered by this specific Medicare Advantage insurance plan compares to 
other Medicare or Medicare Advantage patients. No one had data to address this question. Some 
people offered their opinion, while others preferred not to opine. Responses to this interview question 
are summarized below.  
Less Sick/More Sick: No one responded that Payer patients are less sick. Most interviewees 
thought that Payer patients were sicker or more complicated than other patients. There was consistency 
between the System and the Payer. A representative sample of quotes follows:  
“I think that they're more ill, with more co-morbidities…” (System comment) 
 
“As it relates to this product, Medicare Advantage and [Payer]-like products, they're probably 
sicker than the general population.” (Payer comment) 
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“Yeah, I think they do come in sicker. I think that, not across the board ... I think that probably 80% 
of our membership ... well, 60% of our membership, is fairly healthy, given their age, and 40% are 
fairly sick, and then the ones in our chronic disease management programs are very sick...” (Payer 
comment) 
 
“I think most likely our patients are a little bit sicker. I've always thought we've had a little bit of 
adverse selection, probably because of the benefit design, makes it so appealing to people, that's 
part of it.” (Payer comment) 
 
“I obviously don't have any specific numbers, but it seems like sometimes there are more financial 
difficulties for those [Payer] patients. Potentially more kind of complex social issues. And then not 
all of them, but like I said, a lot of them might have multiple chronic conditions that historically 
were not well-controlled. Probably as a result of the social and financial issues that they have.” 
(System comment) 
 
 Similar: A few people thought that the Payer’s patients were similar to other 
Medicare/Medicare Advantage patients in the level of health. Two representative key informant quotes 
follow.  
 “…I don't think the health varies too tremendously from other Medicare or Medicare Advantage 
patients. I think that the patients that get into the [Payer] program, there's more of a focus on 
accurately documenting what all's going on with them.” (System comment) 
 
“My response is probably 70% or 80% of our members, and we know this, are healthy. It's just 
they remember the sicker ones because they're sick, and disproportionately are from a lower to 
moderate income background. So, they're going to have more difficulty accessing resources.” 
(Payer comment) 
 
Uncertain: Several interviewees were not sure if the Payer’s patients had better or worse health 
than other Medicare/Medicare Advantage patients.  
“I just don’t have enough data to know that or not.” (System comment) 
 
“…you never knew the health of your patients because no one was coding their risk adjustment 
effectively…So the answer is who knows? I don't… I don't think anybody does. I don't think 
Medicare does.” (Payer comment)  
   
One interviewee offered a cautionary comment about trying to reduce Hospital admission 
targets every year:  
“The goal has been to tighten up the target, inpatient admits year after year, that it should go 
lower and lower every year. I think there is a point at which you can’t get lower, or you’re 
providing bad care.” (Payer comment) 
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Additional Metrics: In some cases, interviewees commented about additional metrics which 
they felt were important, but which were not included as part of this study.  In some cases, the 
interviewee expressed that they did not know what the metric figures would be if they had been 
included, while others offered insights into what the figures would be.  
Table 7: Additional metrics suggested by interviewees 
 
Themes derived from 
interviews 
Interviewee grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency between 
Payer & System 
Clinical outcomes X X X 
Average number of visits  X X X 
Patient satisfaction & 
disenrollment rates 
X X X 
Physician satisfaction X   
Length of stay in SNF  X  
Specialist referrals X   
 
Clinical outcomes: Interviewees commented on how the metrics which were the subject of this 
study did not include data on care quality and should.  
“I think that there are a lot of metrics that are not on that sheet that these things probably 
provide benefit to, looking at like just blood pressure control, diabetes control, getting diabetic 
eye checks so that less blindness, less vision changes, also psychological benefits like they are 
now on anti-depressants, lower PHQ-9 scores.” (System comment) 
 
“There's other metrics, health metrics. A1c's have come down. Blood pressures have come down 
in our population. There's a lot of other clinical metrics…” (Payer comment) 
 
One provider noted that s/he receives quality measure data on patients but it is not broken out 
by payer, so s/he cannot tell if the VBR partnership patients in their practice are doing better.  
“I think another metric to think about quality outcomes... I would have liked to have seen 
numbers for my specific [Payer] patients. I think that would have been interesting and kind of 
allowed more buy-in to the fact that, yes, [Payer] is positively impacting my specific patient in 
this specific way.” (System comment) 
 
Based on comments during the interviews, it seems that data on quality measures for these 
patients is provided to the System and participating providers.  
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Average number of visits: Per the Payer, one of the value propositions for the VBR partnership 
is that the Payer clinics handle initial medical and psychosocial assessments and regular chronic 
care/prevention for high risk patients, thereby reducing the number of visits which PCPs have with high 
risk patients. This is expected to free appointment slots for other patients, including new patients, and 
to reduce the average number of visits overall. Data on the average number of visits was not available 
for this study. One provider stated that s/he could not tell a difference in their overall clinic capacity 
after the VBR partnership began. In contrast, other key informants from both the System and Payer 
stated that they expect such a metric would show a positive effect from the VBR partnership.  
“That may be a good data point for us to gather because I do think there's been a significant 
reduction, if not a significant, there has been some level of reduction. If you look specifically at 
the providers that have engaged in the [Payer] network, I think there has been an actual 
reduction in the visits per patient, per PCP, per year.” (System comment) 
 
“I think we have alleviated like 20 or 30 percent of the visits. We've taken them out of the 
practices and they are coming to the [Payer clinic].” (Payer comment) 
 
Patient satisfaction & disenrollment rates: A number of people talked about patient 
satisfaction in general, and some called it out specifically as a metric which they would like to see. No 
interviewees had patient satisfaction figures for these patients. The Payer contracts with another 
insurance company licensed to handle many activities in the County, and the contracted insurance plan 
measures patient satisfaction. Payer key informants mentioned that they tracked disenrollment rates, 
which may be a proxy for dissatisfaction, but these figures were not available.  
One System key informant commented on patient satisfaction with extensivist services:   
“Well, again, going back to the extensivists, I think in select cases, there is a positive impact on 
patient satisfaction when patients see a provider who they know, from the outpatient setting in 
the hospital, which is becoming more uncommon these days. I think that is helpful. You know, it's 
hard to really measure that with such small numbers. You know, it has helped at times, 
especially when it comes to making difficult medical decisions when the patient sees a physician 
that they actually recognize and have had primary care visits with before, as opposed to a 
hospitalist who they're meeting for the first time.” (System comment) 
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Publicly available patient satisfaction star ratings for the Payer’s plan were retrieved. The total 
member experience rating with the health plan was 4 stars out of 5.4 
Physician satisfaction: Data were not available on physician satisfaction. This is an important 
metric to consider adding and is discussed further in Chapter 5. One key informant commented on how 
the Payer tries to enhance physician satisfaction.     
“…over time, it leads to a lot less work at the primary care physician's office because the [Payer]  
team has taken care of many of these issues. That leads to a higher level of physician 
satisfaction. Now that's over time as I said because nothing works right at the beginning no 
matter how hard you try. And when you go into a new area, you can do 99 things right, but the 
100th thing that doesn't go right is the poster child for everything.” (Payer comment) 
 
Length of stay in skilled nursing facilities: The System owns skilled nursing beds, and a key 
informant felt that it would be helpful to track trends in length of stay for skilled nursing beds.  
“Another metric that's not on here, but one that might be worth considering as part of your 
work, is looking at, specifically, length of stay in skilled nursing facilities. And [Payer] has been 
very successful in decreasing that length of stay, because they're more tightly managing their 
patients, and working with those facilities.” (System comment) 
 
Specialist referrals: One advantage of this narrow network is that the System can coordinate 
care with its specialists. One key informant commented that specialist referrals should be added to the 
list of metrics.  
“One thing that, I think, is not on here that … not only was there a lot of new [patients served] 
for [System] on the primary care side, but there was a huge amount of [new patients served] on 
the specialty side… almost all of our referrals to most specialties went to [System].” (Payer 
comment) 
 
Created value in ways not reflected by the metrics:  Respondents were also asked whether the 
VBR tactics created value in other ways not shown by the metrics. One interviewee commented 
generally on value beyond the metrics:  
“I am a believer of this and I think hopefully others will reiterate this over the course of your 
various conversations. I think there's value created for both [Payer] and [System] outside of ... 
metrics on paper here.” (Payer comment) 
 
                                                          
4 Star ratings are standardized insurance plan scores, ranging from 1-5. The star ratings for the VBR partnership’s 
plan were obtained from http://www.medicarehelp.org/2018-medicare-advantage/, accessed 25 February 2018.  
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There were a few comments about learning which occurred through the VBR partnership. The 
areas of learning included how to take on risk contracts, coding and documentation, population health, 
and Medicare Advantage generally.  
“So for us, actually, we learned a lot from [Payer]…I think it's been a great learning experience 
for us, because we've learned how to think about what it would be like to take on risk. We've 
learned to think in terms of our per member per month costs, around physician costs and 
hospital costs and post-acute care costs and that kind of thing, so the reports have sensitized us 
to what we would need to do if we were taking on risk with a much bigger population, sensitized 
us to how to quickly identify patients who are at risk of getting sicker and being hospitalized, and 
how to try to prevent that and such. We didn't really get into it primarily, frankly, with them for 
financial reasons. We really got into it because we wanted to learn from them how you would re-
think through how you deliver care if you were taking on risk for the cost of care, even though 
we weren't taking on risk.” (System comment) 
 
“The learning across the board was very good. The stuff we learned from a population health 
standpoint, from a Medicare Advantage standpoint, that was our first experience doing any of 
that. The learnings were very, very good and very helpful for us.” (System comment) 
 
Two people mentioned that the VBR partnership helped the System when it began building a 
CIN later.  
“I firmly believe that the relationships that we developed that summer and that fall, independent 
providers in [County name], set the foundation for the [CIN name]…I don’t know that we 
would’ve been able… to build our CIN without the work we did with [Payer] to build that 
network. I just don’t think we would be as far along.” (System comment)  
 
“I think it has helped us with our clinically integrated network efforts that physicians that were 
outside kind of looking in or thinking where they’d want to partner, this is kind of an innovative 
experiment in our market that I have to believe attracted some folks to want to work and align 
with us more than some of our competition. So yeah, overall I think it’s been a good thing.” 
(System comment) 
 
Table 8 below includes a summary of the themes about ways in which value was created by the 
VBR partnership, apart from what the metrics reflect. At least two key informants mentioned a theme in 
order for it to be included in the table. All but two of the themes were consistent between the Payer 
and the System.   
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Table 8: VBR partnership creates value in ways not reflected by the metrics 
 
Themes derived from interviews 
Interviewee grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Learned about VBR, risk stratification, 
and/or population health 
X X X 
Helped to build clinical integration network X X X 
Differentiated itself in the market X X X 
Payer clinics improved ambulatory access, 
possibly reduced emergency department 
usage 
X X X 
Learned HCC coding/RAF scores5 X X X 
Increased patient/member satisfaction X X X 
Reduced PCP visits by seeing patients at 
Payer clinics 
X X X 
Extensivists created value by being on site 
at Hospital, via face to face conversations 
with attending physicians and patients and 
their families, improved patient 
satisfaction 
 
X 
 
 
Quality measures are improved X   
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important based on the key informant’s knowledge of 
the topic and the strength of their opinion. 
 
Overall advantage to System of VBR partnership: Key informants were asked if they thought 
that the VBR partnership was advantageous overall to the System in 2015. Most of the key informants 
provided an affirmative response to this question. A sample of quotes from the key informants is 
included below.  
“Our organization, at that time, we needed something like this. I would call it an experiment. We 
needed an experiment like this that was relevant to what was going on in the industry. We didn’t 
really have any other opportunities like this on our plate. And to have a company with the 
background and experience that [Payer] brought to the table, I think was very fortunate for us.” 
(System comment) 
 
“I think their primary objectives were to begin to wade into value based care…. I think we’ve 
demonstrated our ability to help them do that…So I think it has been advantageous both from an 
operational standpoint, but a strategic standpoint as well.” (Payer comment)   
 
“I think it’s done what it was supposed to do, which was, as stated by them in ’14 – It was to get 
into value based care without taking much risk, and they didn’t really have to take any risk. I 
                                                          
5 Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC) are part of a risk adjustment model used by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, HCC conditions generate a Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) score which attempts to account for 
patient illness in calculating reimbursement. (CMS, 2017) 
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think that’s what happened... They got to see how value based care works. They’ve taken and 
copied a lot of what we’ve done and implemented it. So I think it’s done what it was supposed to 
do.” (Payer comment)  
 
A few people responded that they did not think that the VBR partnership was advantageous to 
the System in 2015. The reasons given were that it did not achieve the financial or membership targets, 
though it required a fair amount of work.  
“…all of this has been a lot of work for us for a comparatively small amount of patients… out of 
the thousands and thousands that we admit and discharge every year.” (System comment) 
 
A few key informants did not answer the interview question with an affirmative or a negative. 
Examples were:  
“I think in 2015 no one had a good grasp of how this is working, what the responsibilities are, 
what the patient needs to do, what we need to do. I think now in 2017 it's very advantageous for 
both groups, but I think it was a little bit of a rocky start to start with.” (System comment) 
  
“It is hard for us to see X number of patients a day to pay the bills and then also have that value 
based care where we want to try to take care as much as we can here in the clinic to keep them 
out of the hospitals.” (System comment) 
 
One Payer key informant mentioned how the influx of new members during growth periods 
makes it more difficult to achieve metrics: 
“Remember when you're growing, and you're growing fairly rapidly, you're getting people in 
[County] that are coming in completely un-coded, so any benefit you get from the first year and 
the results, you get another load of un-coded patients. So you have to get to the equilibrium 
between coded and un-coded patients every year to the point ...to some mathematical inflection 
point where you start seeing the benefit of all your work…we will get there…” (Payer comment) 
 
Research Aim 2: Stakeholder Opinion about How the Metrics were Realized 
The purpose of Aim 2 of this study was to delineate stakeholder opinion about how the metrics 
were realized, including VBR tactics. The Payer provided a list of tactics utilized in the VBR partnership.  
After discussion with the Payer and System, the list of tactics was incorporated into the interview guide 
and pre-interview briefing sheet, as follows:  
• Payer clinics for high risk patients 
• Payer employed extensivists 
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• Effective use of technology and data  
• Primary care capitation 
• Monthly operating committee 
• New financial incentives 
• Complementary benefit designs to support the clinical model 
• Marketing/word of mouth referrals, and other grass roots efforts  
Tactics which had the greatest impact: Key informants were asked which tactics had the 
greatest impact on the first year performance of the VBR partnership. Responses are summarized in the 
below table, with gray shading indicating the most important tactics based on key informant input and 
judgment.  Key informants could list more than one tactic, and many people did list more than one 
tactic. However, several of the 17 people interviewed did not list any tactics as having the greatest 
impact.  Reasons for this included not being able to identify any tactic as having the greatest impact and 
stating that tactics could have been effective under different circumstances. One key informant felt that 
it was not a single tactic that impacted the metrics, but the interaction of all of the tactics.   
“I really am a firm believer that there's not really one piece of the puzzle that drives the majority 
of the outcome. I think it's the comprehensive way in which all the different components kind of 
come together.” (Payer comment) 
 
For the most part, responses were consistent between key informants of the Payer and System. 
Overall, the Payer employed extensivists and Payer clinics for high risk patients emerged as having the 
greatest impact on the metrics. Note: In tables 9 through 18 in this section, at least two key informants 
mentioned a theme in order for it to be included in the table, and gray shading indicates themes judged 
to be most important based on the key informant’s knowledge of the topic and the strength of their 
opinion.  
  
  
51 
 
Table 9: Tactics which had the greatest impact on 2015 metrics 
  
Major VBR tactic 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency between Payer 
& System 
Payer employed extensivists X X X 
Payer clinics for high risk 
patients   
X X X 
Effective use of technology 
& data 
X X X 
Complementary benefit 
designs 
X X X 
New financial incentives  X  
Monthly operating 
committee 
 X  
Capitation   X 
Marketing/word of mouth 
referrals 
  X 
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
The sections below are organized in the same order as the tactics having the greatest impact 
from Table 9. Themes about how each tactic helped to achieve the metrics, or how they did not, are 
shown in the left column of each table below.  
Major VBR tactic: Payer employed extensivists: Extensivists were often mentioned by the key 
informants as the tactic with the greatest impact. An extensivist is a physician who cares for highly 
complex patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or acute conditions) in a clinic and/or inpatient setting. In 
Payer-run clinics, high risk patients are seen by the extensivists, along with other members of the care 
team. In the Hospital, the extensivists co-manage patients covered under the VBR partnership’s plan, 
along with System-employed hospitalists and other employed or non-employed attending physicians. 
The extensivists do not co-round with the hospitalists, reportedly because the timing of such co-
rounding would be too difficult to time. Instead, the extensivists talk daily in person or by phone with 
the hospitalists about Payer patients. From a Hospital privileging and documentation standpoint, the 
extensivist acts as a consultant; they do not serve as the primary or attending physician.  
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Key informants commented about how they believe the extensivists positively affect the metrics 
in the inpatient setting.  
“I think by reviewing discharge readiness criteria with the attending on a daily basis, that helped 
get patients out of the Hospital really as soon as they’re ready to leave. That contributes to the 
lower than average length of stay.” (System comment) 
 
“They help to facilitate getting after discharge, or post-discharge, care. They are available to 
speak face-to-face as opposed to having to go through a call center and coordinate some type of 
peer-to-peer discussion.” (System comment) 
 
One primary care physician commented about how s/he values the extensivists’ communication. 
“…the only time I've ever had a hospitalist call me about a patient has been from a [Payer 
employed] extensivist. I wish hospitalists, in general, would do that more because they don't 
know the patient, we do...the family doctor…so really working with the extensivist and the family 
doctor to coordinate that patient's care and kind of make sure that they're appropriate for 
discharge, and they have the right follow-up after discharge is important. That verbal, five-
minute conversation I think is underutilized, but I have experienced it in a positive way with the 
extensivists from [Payer].” (System comment) 
 
In the review of hospital care delivery metrics earlier in this chapter, there were key informant 
comments about the hospital admits per 1,000 metric being lowered through the Payer’s management 
of inpatient vs. observation status. The extensivists are involved in this; they review Hospital admission 
criteria on behalf of the Payer. This activity and its impact on the metrics is included as a theme in the 
table below.  
In the Payer clinics, the extensivists and their care team identify and treat high risk patients and 
help develop and implement disease management plans.  
“…their extensivists are spending, you know 30 minutes, an hour, two hours, with their highest 
risk members when they come in to be seen, whereas our primary care physicians, on average, 
are spending 10 to 15 minutes. So I think having an extensivist that can dedicate the time to 
addressing some of the really complex needs for these patients is important.” (System comment) 
 
In addition to seeing patients in the Hospital and Payer clinics, the extensivists also follow 
patients in other settings. They also see patients in skilled nursing and rehab facilities, and nurse 
practitioners under the supervision of the extensivists see patients at home when necessary.   
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Table 10 summarizes the themes that emerged under the tactic of Payer employed extensivists. 
All three themes showed consistency between the Payer and System key informants.     
Table 10: Major VBR tactic: Payer employed extensivists 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Reduced ALOS by daily rounding & 
reviewing discharge readiness criteria with 
attending physician/hospitalist   
X X X 
Reduced inpatient admits via stringent 
admission criteria established by the Payer 
(vs. use of observation status) 
X X X 
Improved patient disease management 
which improved hospital care delivery 
metrics, via longer patient visits in Payer 
clinics and in Hospital 
X X X 
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
Major VBR tactic: Payer clinics for high risk patients: The Payer operates multiple clinics for 
high risk patients in the County. There is overlap between the Payer clinic tactic and the extensivist 
tactic, because the extensivists help to staff the Payer clinics, along with advance practice providers, 
nutritionists, licensed clinical social workers, medical assistants, and other staff.  At the Payer clinics, 
new plan members can receive an initial medical and psychosocial assessment. Those who are assessed 
as high risk patients are offered chronic disease management programs. Some of the Payer clinic staff, 
typically advance practice providers and medical assistants, visit patients at home when needed. The 
extensivists conducted the home visits in 2015, before the advance practice providers were hired. Post-
discharge follow-up appointments for high risk patients are provided in the Payer clinics. Home 
monitoring equipment is managed via the Payer clinics.  
“So I think decreasing inpatient admissions is a function of better risk stratification and care 
management in the outpatient setting. So I think that is directly related to their high risk clinics, 
their extensivists, their use of predictive analytics and technology to effectively identify those 
members. I would attribute that performance to those interventions. I think average length of 
stay has decreased significantly because of the same types of programs. Likely, when [Payer] 
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patients are admitted, they may be better managed leading up to the admission, which 
decreases length of stay.” (System comment)  
 
“I think one of the big benefits for the high risk clinics are the magic words ‘it's free’, but once 
patients go there they kind of get things under control.” (System comment) 
 
“…the clinics to me are the main item that is different than anybody else. You don't see that with 
other payers, here anyway, in [city]. You'd think that that would get used more.” (System 
comment)  
 
 Table 11 below summarizes the themes that emerged under the tactic of Payer clinics for high 
risk patients. Four out of the six themes showed consistency between the Payer and System key 
informants.  
Table 11: Major VBR tactic: Payer clinics for high risk patients 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Reduced Hospital (re)admission rate 
through early and thorough new patient 
assessment of complex, high risk patients 
and initiation of disease management 
programs 
X X X 
Reduced Hospital (re)admission rate 
through frequent ongoing contact with 
established high risk patients, including 
post-discharge care, outreach, care 
coordination 
X X X 
Reduced Hospital utilization and medical 
spend via risk stratification to identify high 
risk patients, followed by interventions 
X X X 
Admissions lowered through quick access 
to be seen in Payer clinics. Shortage of 
PCPs to see Medicare patients, and PCP 
clinic access is not always good.  
X X X 
Payer clinics were conveniently located  X  
This tactic took time to work; Payer clinics 
started in late 2014, too late to fully impact 
2015 metrics  
 X  
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
Major VBR tactic: Effective use of technology & data: The Payer operates a technology 
“command center” at their main office. The Payer uses the technology in the command center to 
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aggregate clinical and financial data into an enterprise data warehouse and analyze the data in a timely 
manner. The Payer and the System are on the same electronic health record (EHR). There is an 
integrated data connection between the EHR and the Payer’s enterprise data warehouse. One key 
informant commented on the importance of being on the same EHR:  
“Well, one thing that I'll mention is technology and data. So they initially, when Payer joined, 
they were not on [System’s EHR vendor]. I don't know how long that was for. And I think that 
was really difficult, so they definitely took feedback from the physicians and got on [System’s 
EHR vendor]. And so that's made a really big difference in terms of communication, so I 
appreciated that.” (System comment) 
 
The Payer uses proprietary predictive analytics to identify patients at high risk of progressing to 
a more severe disease state or at high risk of hospitalization. High cost patients are identified through 
claims data and utilization reports. High cost and high risk patients are reviewed by Payer clinicians and 
staff on a routine basis. Automated alerts and tasks are worked on by Payer staff. Interventions are 
initiated as a result. A number of key informants mentioned valuable and timely reports which they 
received from the Payer, which were generated via the Payer’s technology and data. Some of the 
System key informants mentioned that they wish they could receive data about patients who are 
identified as high risk. They mentioned that the Payer has this data, but it is not getting into their hands. 
They feel that it would help them to provide better care.  
One System key informant noted s/he had visited the command center and stated, “It was very 
impressive.” However, most System key informants did not seem to have visited the command center 
and did not seem to be familiar with the Payer’s technology. This is not surprising, given that the Payer’s 
office is located geographically far away from the County.  
Table 12 below summarizes the themes that emerged under the tactic of effective use of 
technology and data. Two out of the three themes showed consistency between the Payer and System 
key informants.  
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Table 12: Major VBR tactic: Effective use of technology and data 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Reduced admits via use of multiple data 
sources and risk stratification to identify 
high risk patients, then brought them into 
Payer clinics; improved hospital care 
delivery metrics  
X X X 
Reports/report cards included valuable and 
timely data about leakage6, membership, 
hospital care delivery, specialist referrals, 
Payer clinic visits, RAF score, dollar spend, 
medical loss ratio (MLR)7; positive effect on 
gain share  
X X X 
System providers did not receive all of the 
data they wished about patients’ high risk 
status and psychosocial factors 
 X  
 
Major VBR tactic: Complementary benefit designs: Key informants were asked to review the list 
of plan benefits and to respond if they were aware of the benefits, as well as whether any of the 
benefits contributed to the first year metrics. Some System key informants expressed a lack of 
knowledge of the benefits, or a lack of knowledge of detailed features of the benefits.  
Many key informants commented on which benefits they felt were the most impactful upon 
metrics. Key informants could list more than one benefit, and many people did answer with more than 
one. Not every key informant specified one or more benefits as having the greatest impact on metrics.  
  
                                                          
6 In healthcare insurance, the term leakage refers to the use of out-of-network facilities or providers. 
7 Medical loss ratio (MLR) is a percentage of insurance company funds which are expended on patient care. 
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Table 13:  Benefits noted as having the greatest impact on 2015 metrics 
 
Benefit 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency between 
Payer & System 
$0 premium X X X 
$0 co-pay for PCP or Payer 
clinic visits 
 X  
Extensivist care model X X X 
Drug benefit X X X 
Home monitoring X X X 
Initial medical & psychosocial 
assessment 
 X  
Ride program  X  
Dental   X 
Nutrition   X 
Podiatry/foot care   X 
Vision   X 
Gray shading indicates those judged to be most important. 
Several of the Payer key informants stated that all of the benefits were important, or else they 
could not single out one or more benefits as more important than the others. One person summed up 
this sentiment about benefits by saying:  
“…each one of these has a relationship to the overall objectives we're trying to achieve.” (Payer 
comment)  
 
Some key informants expressed that the plan benefits are very good overall. A few key notable 
informant comments were:  
“Some of their plan benefits really can make the patient feel like, "Wow." Especially for the sicker 
patients, that, ‘This is great, I've never had care like this.’" (System comment) 
 
“I think the membership we do have, has been because we have the best Medicare benefits in 
the County, really of any Medicare Advantage plan.” (Payer comment) 
 
“I actually have a lot of patients who I wish were part of [Payer] because they have a lot of issues 
and barriers that would be overcome or met if they were part of [Payer], based on the plan 
benefits.” (System comment) 
 
Several key informants stated that $0 premiums were the most impactful plan benefit. One key 
informant summed up how this benefit impacted the metrics.  
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“I think the zero dollar premium helped that metric about new [patients served] for us. It 
attracted a type of patient that maybe we hadn’t seen at [System]. That was a significant 
financial incentive that possibly caused people to switch allegiances in that [County name] 
market. And my theory is that a lot of those new patients were previously loyal to [competitor] 
and a zero dollar premium plan tied to [System/Hospital] network was enough to switch and 
helped us hit that new [patients served goal].” (System comment) 
 
Table 14 below summarizes the themes that emerged under the tactic of complementary 
benefit designs. The table is organized in the same order as the rankings in Table 13. All but two of the 
themes showed consistency between the Payer and System key informants.  
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Table 14: Major VBR tactic: Complementary benefit designs to support the clinical model 
  
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
All benefits: Better benefits than Medicare 
or other MA plans, at lower cost attracted 
new patients 
X X X 
$0 premium increased membership metric, 
especially with members with tight 
finances 
 X  
$0 copay to PCP/Payer clinics prevented 
leakage, which helped to keep costs down; 
improved opportunity for gain share 
X X X 
$0 copay reduced member out-of-pocket 
cost, was appealing if member finances are 
tight, helped grow membership 
 X  
Extensivists staffed Payer clinics & 
Hospital, rounded in nursing homes, 
conducted home visits, developed 
relationship with sickest patients, did 
proactive outreach & intervened, spent 
more time per patient (Also see Table 10, 
Tactic: Extensivists)  
X X X 
Drug benefit steered to generics vs. brand 
drugs, mail order was convenient; this 
reduced cost of care & improved 
outcomes, impacted gain share 
opportunity and hospital care delivery 
X X X 
Home monitoring for sickest of the sick 
helped to reduce readmissions 
X X X 
Initial medical & psychosocial assessment 
was conducted early to identify high risk 
patients, then Payer intervened to help 
improve health, improved hospital care 
delivery 
X X X 
Initial medical & psychosocial assessment 
helped to document conditions accurately 
X X X 
Ride program addressed transportation as 
a barrier to care for those who can’t drive, 
increased receipt of preventive care, 
ultimately avoided ED utilization & 
unplanned admissions 
X X X 
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
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Missing benefit–Home visits:  A few key informants commented on home visits as a plan benefit 
which they did not see in the benefit list provided in the interviews. Home visits are conducted by Payer 
clinic staff, typically one day per week. Patients identified as high risk who are not able to easily come to 
the Payer clinics are candidates for home visits. Nurse practitioners typically conduct the home visit with 
help from medical assistants. The nurse practitioner works under the supervision of the extensivists. The 
extensivists staffed the home visits in 2015, before the nurse practitioners were hired. One key 
informant commented further about the advantage of home visits:  
“…they do go out to the patient's homes, and some of these homes are trailer homes. So that's 
also advantageous. Who does home visits today?” (System comment) 
 
New benefit-Palliative care: One key informant mentioned that palliative care will be added 
soon as a new benefit. Palliative care will be targeted to the 1-2% sickest patients, and it will be offered 
at no cost to patients, via home visits.  
Major VBR tactic: New financial incentives: New financial incentives include the gain share 
incentive, as well as a fee paid to PCPs to coordinate care with the Payer clinics. Capitation, or PMPM 
payments to physicians, is a separate tactic. Key informants were asked whether the financial incentives 
impacted them or caused them to make changes. For the most part, key informants responded that the 
incentives did not impact them. System key informants commented that financial incentives were not a 
driver for them and/or they did not expect them to be drivers for physicians.   
“From my end with my practitioners, that’s not a driver for us. The financial aspect of it, is not a 
driver for us...I think that first and foremost is, they like having those extra tools at their hands 
for the patient, and the financial incentives, you know, is a bonus…in general, I think, you know, 
for the most part, we know that people, especially physicians, really aren’t financially driven. 
Most of the time it’s really more about the patient and their care and their outcome.” (System 
comment)  
  
“… I don’t think the gain share arrangement has really any material impact, currently, either in 
terms of realizing an actual gain share, or impacting or motivating the providers necessarily.” 
(System comment) 
 
“I don’t think they [physicians] spend much time thinking about it [gain share], because you 
know the number of [Payer] patients that are attributed to any one of our physicians is so small, 
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in comparison to the rest of their panel, that it’s just not a priority for them. So there really 
hasn’t been a lot of conversation about it to be honest with you.” (System comment) 
 
Apart from the gain share, there is another financial incentive related to referrals for the initial 
medical and psychosocial patient assessment. There is a financial incentive for physicians to coordinate 
care for their patients with the Payer clinics for a free initial medical and psychosocial assessment:  
“[Payer] put some money behind those [brand name] assessments, incentivized our doctors to do 
that, and I think that probably helped reenergize folks around understanding, you know, ‘I’ve got 
this patient. Let’s get them in and get to know them better, spend a little more time with them, 
and help partner with them to manage their health.’ And the bonus payments they did with 
[brand name of assessment] I would like to think helped, I don’t know, motivate, incentivize, 
energize our primary care physicians about the importance of doing something like that in a way 
that probably they haven’t seen in years and years.” (System comment) 
 
Table 15 below summarizes the themes that emerged under the tactic of new financial 
incentives. Two out of the four themes were consistent between the Payer and System.  
Table 15: Major VBR tactic: New financial incentives 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Gain share not realized because 
membership was too low to break even 
X X X 
Gain share not realized because it takes 
time to reduce the cost of care  
X X X 
Gain share not realized because 
infrastructure costs such as Payer clinics & 
extensivists had to be covered first 
 X  
Fees for coordinated care with Payer clinics 
motivated physicians 
 X  
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
Major VBR tactic: Monthly operating committee:  An operating committee meeting is held 
regularly with participants from the leadership of both the Payer and System. In 2015, these meetings 
were held monthly. The operating committee meetings provide an opportunity to discuss data and 
metrics and make tactical adjustments in order to attempt to achieve goals.  
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A few of the key informants said they were not aware of monthly operating committees. The 
people who were knowledgeable about the monthly operating committee seem to have positive 
comments about the meetings helping to achieve objectives. 
“…the fact that we were getting together and we still do, every month and look at reporting on 
what's the membership like, where are they going, is there leakage, if so, what are we doing 
about it? Those were conversations we had not had ever on a timely basis with a payer. And I 
think that was probably the most significant kind of win in this model in year one is they were 
able to come in and prove, ‘We can get you timely data. We can sit and talk with you as a team 
and come up with tactics to adjust performance, adjust access, do things to help retain and 
attract these members.’" (System comment) 
 
Table 16 below includes one theme that emerged under this tactic, and it was consistent 
between the Payer and System key informants. However, the impact of this tactic on metrics was not 
apparent, at least not directly.    
Table 16: Major VBR tactic: Monthly operating committee 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Operating committee refined how System 
and Payer work together to ensure mutual 
success (not specific to any metric) 
X X X 
 
Major VBR tactic: Primary care capitation:  Capitation is a fixed PMPM payment from the Payer 
to providers in exchange for providing care to plan members of the payer. The VBR partnership’s 
capitation payment is only for encounters; medications and labs are carved out. Under the VBR 
partnership, the capitation amount was intended to reimburse the providers for the average number of 
times that they typically see a traditional Medicare patient. Additional patient visit requirements would 
be alleviated by the Payer clinics which help to manage chronic populations.  
There have been increases to the capitation amount since the partnership began in order to 
make the capitation more attractive and help the provider clinics with the additional administrative time 
and engagement in the patient population. Some of the key informants commented on this:  
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“We got very little engagement at that [specific dollar amount] PMPM capitation, so we 
changed it…” (Payer comment) 
 
 “…the capitation could have been effective if they had had a higher capitation rate, especially in 
the first year.” (System comment)  
 
One Payer key informant mentioned that capitation was not familiar to many of the primary 
care physicians and some education had to occur during the sales process. None of the key informants 
mentioned capitation payments as one of the tactics that had the greatest impact on the 2015 metrics.  
Table 17 below includes themes that emerged under the primary care capitation tactic. All were 
consistent between the System and Payer.  
Table 17: Major VBR tactic: Primary care capitation 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
Capitation PMPM payments were received 
whether PCPs saw patients or not, which 
incentivized PCPs to join network and grew 
membership 
X X X 
Capitation rate was too low initially, which 
hurt PCP enrollment  
X X X 
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
Major VBR tactic: Marketing & word of mouth referrals: Marketing was directed toward 
potential patients and toward independent providers through a shared effort of the Payer, the System, 
and a local health plan which had delegated sales and marketing responsibility. Payer representatives 
explained that the Payer prefers more grass roots efforts, localized meetings and relationship building to 
the large scale, nationalized marketing approaches which some Medicare Advantage plans take, though 
some local advertising did occur. One of the grass roots approaches to attract patients was the 
placement of marketing agents near doctors’ offices.  
A few of the key informants explained how when initially contracting with local independent 
PCPs, representatives from the Payer and System would jointly conduct localized meetings. They would 
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start with a name of a physician who one of them knew, schedule a visit to the physician’s office, meet 
with the business manager, and explain the contract and the capitation rates. One key informant talked 
about how the Payer helped in relationship building with independent physicians:  
“[Payer] did a nice job early on in sort of opening some doors and building bridges with a number 
of independent physicians in the market, and those relationships have strengthened.” (System 
comment) 
 
Several key informants mentioned issues with marketing which negatively impacted some of the 
metrics. There was a mention of PCPs failing to refer patients to the VBR partnership’s plan due to 
compliance concerns, though there are reportedly compliant avenues to refer patients. Some stated 
that an outside organization which is involved in marketing and sales was not organized at the beginning 
of the VBR partnership or was delayed in getting started. Some stated that brokers did not fully 
understand this VBR product.  
Table 18 below summarizes the themes that emerged under this tactic. Six out of seven were 
consistent between the Payer and the System.  
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Table 18: Major VBR tactic: Marketing & word of mouth referrals 
 
How metrics were achieved or why they 
weren’t – themes derived from interviews 
Key informant grouping 
(X indicates theme identified by groups below) 
Payer key 
informants 
System key 
informants 
Consistency 
between Payer & 
System 
PCP network composition increased via 
grassroots efforts to engage independent 
physicians 
X X X 
Membership increased through marketing 
agents placed in or near doctors’ offices 
X X X 
Advertising locally increased awareness, 
which helped to build membership 
X X X 
Membership could be increased through 
compliant PCP referrals to this plan, but 
such referrals did not happen often 
enough which kept membership low 
X X X 
Membership didn’t meet goal because 
organizations involved in marketing & sales 
weren’t organized at the start or were 
delayed. Brokers didn’t understand 
product. 
X X X 
Network and benefits design helped with 
marketing and sales, which helped to build 
membership  
X X X 
Sales hurt by competing health plan 
offering $0 cost PPO, which hurt 
membership 
X 
 
 
 
Gray shading indicates themes judged to be most important. 
Other tactics/missing tactics: Key informants were asked about the completeness of the list of 
tactics provided in the interviews. Did the key informant notice any missing tactics? Several key 
informants shared their thoughts on other tactics employed by the Payer which may be worth 
considering as additions to the tactic list.  
Two elements of the Payer clinics were noted as being particularly important. One was the care 
team which works with the extensivists. The care team includes nurse practitioners, clinical social 
workers, nutritionists, and medical assistants. The other element was disease management programs. 
These are standardized clinical interventions to help high risk patients manage their chronic diseases.  
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Key informants suggested that a sales function and value based network development should be 
stipulated in the marketing tactic. Another key informant stated that “internal” marketing within the 
System including to specialists and Hospital staff – not just external marketing to patients and 
independent physicians – was important.  
Other Considerations 
During the interviews, other important themes emerged which did not fit into Aim 1 or 2. These 
additional themes are summarized below, along with illustrative quotations.  
Why System entered the partnership: Key informants of the System discussed their initial 
reasons for entering the VBR partnership.  
“… one of the reasons that we've partnered with [Payer] in the first place was to try to learn how 
to actually redesign how care was delivered. How to identify the highest risk patients and how to 
especially focus on them with care management and go into their homes and that kind of thing.” 
(System comment) 
“I know [System] wants to move to more value based is my understanding and away from 
productivity, so I think having a partnership with [Payer] makes sense. There's a lot we could 
learn from them.” (System comment) 
“I think we learned, and are learning, a lot about what it would be like if we were taking risk…” 
(System comment) 
 
Comments about the relationship: There were primarily positive comments about the VBR 
partnership relationship from both parties.  
“We respect the leadership of [Payer] a lot.” (System comment) 
 
“I will give [Payer] a lot of credit, they have been flexible with [us], they have been willing to 
make changes in how they operate and help us with how we operate to really ensure mutual 
success.” (System comment)  
 
“…it’s been hard to get a lot of physician or Hospital engagement, because the membership and 
plan size is so small.” (System comment) 
 
“I think the arrangement is working out very well. I think it's been very beneficial for the patients 
for the most part, or actually for a great deal of the part.” (System comment) 
 
“Overall, I think it’s been a good partnership.” (Payer comment) 
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“We have a great relationship with [System], and certainly the leadership and we are aligned… if 
we continue in this fashion, it'll be a very successful relationship. And just one other comment, 
the [System] leadership has been the most forthcoming, honest, and good to work with that I've 
ever had. I don't know if that means anything, but it means something to me.” (Payer comment) 
 
System developing its own VBR resources: An important theme arose about the System 
building its own VBR resources and how that may affect the future of the VBR partnership. 
“…all of the things that they [Payer] were doing as a health plan, if we were going to take on the 
direct risk ourselves with an employer, or with a commercial plan, those were all the kinds of 
things that we would need to do ourselves, and not outsource…if you're going to take on risk 
yourself, you need to develop and have your own in-house, and sometimes embedded, care 
management people and social workers, and nutritionists, and that kind of thing yourself. You 
don't want to outsource it...if we're going to take on risk for a hundred or two hundred thousand 
lives, we have to learn how to have those resources ourselves, rather than relying on another 
third party to do that. Frankly, all of us have been relying on health plans to do that over the last 
20 or 30 years, and it hasn't really been very effective.” (System comment) 
 
“You know [Payer] is an important partner, and particularly around Medicare Advantage. I think 
over the last couple of years we [System] have developed. We've come a long ways in a relatively 
short period of time, and have developed a lot of internal capabilities around population health, 
care management, data and analytics that we didn't have in 2015. And so I think the evolution of 
the partnership is going to have to recognize that we're in a different place than we were before, 
and we have a lot of opportunities as a System that we can pursue in the Medicare space moving 
forward...” (System comment) 
 
“I think they [System] are learning a lot from this partnership, but the question is, in my mind, 
is...what are they actually able to do internally? Because I'm not sure that [System] can mimic 
everything we [Payer] are doing internally… Hopefully we're doing it the best of anybody, and 
[System] is learning something from it. But again, I think it remains to be seen whether they're 
able to do it themselves.” (Payer comment) 
 
Suggestions for improvement: Key informants were asked if they would like to suggest any 
changes to the VBR partnership.  Suggestions are summarized and shared here for consideration by the 
System and the Payer.  
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Table 19: Suggestions/comments for improvement - made by System key informants 
 
Topic Suggestion/Comment 
Ancillary services Allow PCP staff to provide some of the services that are provided at the Payer 
clinics, like nutritionist services. “We've been told that the [Payer] patients to 
have to see their [Payer] nutritionist, they can't see our nutritionist, and that's a 
little bit of a barrier to care for some of these patients.”(System comment) 
Communication Work on extensivist relationships with specialists and improving communication 
between extensivists and specialists. Not all of those relationships are good. 
Provide PCPs with some verbiage about why patients should go to the Payer 
clinics for the initial medical and psychosocial assessment. “The patient will flat 
out say, ‘Well, what are they going to do that you don't do?’ I don't know. It's 
hard to answer without making somebody come off in a negative light.” (System 
comment) 
Provide PCPs with patient risk stratification results, so that they can better 
identify and care for high risk patients.  
Incentives Incentivize the PCP clinic staff to help patients of the VBR partnership 
Try to issue PCP capitation checks monthly rather than quarterly 
Include physician assistants as PCPs who are able to receive capitation 
payments, like nurse practitioners can 
Quality Help PCPs to meet their quality metrics by putting information into the right 
place in the EHR 
 
Table 20: Suggestions/comments for improvement - made by Payer key informants 
 
Topic Suggestion/Comment 
Branding Consider a “private label” plan - one branded with the System’s name 
Incentives Get specialists and Hospital(s) on some type of value based incentives, not just 
PCPs 
Orientation Include Payer in primary care on-boarding and orientation programs with 
primary care clinic staff and providers 
Strategy Consider limiting the number of Medicare Advantage plans with which the 
System contracts. There are too many, and they are competitive.  
   
Summary of Findings 
Review of key metrics: 
• New patients served exceeded the goal and was an important metric to achieve for the System, 
given patients have many high quality providers available to them in the County.  
• The metric PCP network composition – the proportion of network PCPs who are independent - 
did not meet the goal set for 2015.  
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• The membership metric did not meet the goal set for 2015. This metric was one of the most 
often discussed in the interviews and was clearly of high importance to the System and Payer.  
• Gain share alignment, or the achievement of a profit sharing distribution from the VBR 
partnership, did not occur in 2015. This metric is an indirect measure of financial performance. 
Financial performance figures were not included in the study because the Payer and the System 
did not come to agreement on financial performance figures. 
• Hospital care delivery metrics performed better than the CMS fee-for-service comparative 
benchmarks in 2015. Specific metrics were inpatient admits per 1,000 patients, average length 
of stay, and readmission rate. The Hospital and System also actively participated in efforts to 
manage these metrics.  
• Themes of value creation beyond the metrics included: learning about VBR, differentiation in 
the market, learning about HCC codes and RAF scores, increasing patient satisfaction, improving 
access, and reducing PCP visits via the Payer clinics.  
Stakeholder opinion about how the metrics were realized: 
• Tactics identified by key informants as having the greatest impact upon the metrics were Payer 
employed extensivists and Payer clinics for high risk patients.  
• Payer employed extensivists were thought to reduce the Hospital’s average length of stay by 
communicating daily with attending physicians about discharge readiness criteria.  
• Extensivists also were thought to reduce the inpatient admits through careful management of 
admissions to inpatient status vs. observation status.  
• Extensivists influenced other metrics positively by having longer face-to-face visits with more 
complex patients, in the Payer clinics and in the Hospital.   
• Payer clinics for high risk patients reduced utilization overall as well as medical spend via risk 
stratification to identify high risk patients, followed by interventions.  
  
70 
 
• Payer clinics for high risk patients were thought to reduce the Hospital (re)admission rate 
through early and thorough new patient assessment of high risk patients and initiation of 
disease management programs.  
• Payer clinics for high risk patients helped to reduce the Hospital (re)admission rate by frequent, 
ongoing contact with established high risk patients, including post-discharge care, outreach and 
care coordination.  
• In 2015, most of the tactics seemed to be initiated by the Payer, given their expertise in VBR, 
with the System participating as a partner in some of the tactics (e.g., monthly operating 
committee, marketing).   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Additional Discussion    
 In addition to the findings reviewed in Chapter 4, key discussion points are summarized below.  
 The narrow network HMO product, combined with consumer incentives such as $0 copay, 
attracted patients to the VBR partnership’s plan, which brought new patients into the System.  The $0 
copay helped to incent in-network utilization, which helped to keep costs down. Though it was not 
mentioned in the interviews, the $0 copay likely reduced barriers to seeking care at PCP clinics and the 
Payer clinics. This likely had a positive impact on the hospital care delivery metrics by delivering more 
proactive care.  
 The membership goal was not met in 2015. Key informants felt this was because the County was 
not receptive to an HMO product and sales and marketing tactics fell short. Low membership also arose 
as a reason why a gain share payment had not yet been attained. The cost of infrastructure compared 
with the low enrollment in 2015 made it impossible to realize a gain share in the first year.  
All three components of the hospital care delivery metric performed well vs. CMS benchmarks. 
However, the actual pre-2015 hospital utilization figures for these patients are not available. Neither the 
System nor Payer had complete claims data for this group of patients pre-2015.   
One limitation of the hospital care delivery metrics used in this study was that it is not possible 
to isolate the effects of VBR tactics or plan benefits. As noted in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that 
Medicare Advantage enrollees tend to be healthier than traditional Medicare beneficiaries (Cooper & 
Trivedi, 2012; Greenwald, Levy & Ingber, 2000; Miller, Decker & Parker, 2016). It is possible that patients 
enrolled in this plan in 2015 were healthier than the CMS benchmark and their better health resulted in 
lower hospital utilization. However, as noted in Chapter 4, most key informants felt that these patients 
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were sicker or more complex than other patients. If a risk adjustment method is available to the VBR 
partnership in the future, it would improve accuracy of the hospital care delivery metrics.  
Physician satisfaction, patient satisfaction, and key clinical outcomes are not current partnership 
metrics but would be useful to add and to monitor going forward. Physician satisfaction should be 
measured every 1 - 2 years. More frequent surveys than that may be difficult for busy physicians to 
respond to. Surveys should include opportunities for the physicians to provide suggestions for 
improvement. Patient satisfaction surveys are part of Medicare Stars public reporting, and results could 
be added to partnership reports. Key clinical outcome measures would be mutually agreed upon by the 
Payer and System. Examples of outpatient clinical outcome measures are hemoglobin A1c control, blood 
pressure control, receipt of recommended immunizations, and cessation of tobacco use; the actual list 
should reflect current Payer and System priorities.  
In spite of falling short on some of the metric goals, it seems that the VBR partnership was 
advantageous overall to the System in its first year. Few new relationships of this sort perform exactly as 
planned. There was limited financial commitment on the part the System, the high risk clinics and 
extensivists are funded by the Payer and beneficial for the System and its patients, and the System was 
beginning to accomplish their strategy of learning about managing the health of populations, taking 
insurance risk and building network relationships with independent providers. Most feedback about the 
partnership was positive. There was sentiment that the VBR partnership’s plan was a lot of work for a 
small number of patients and that it was hard to work partially in a VBR environment while still 
depending on “volume” for most of the patient revenue.   
The metric results are expected to continue to improve over time, after the initial learning 
occurred in the first year of the VBR partnership. The metrics themselves – what is measured – will need 
to continue to evolve and change as the VBR partnership evolves. Some new metrics will be identified 
and will need to be added, and others may be removed if they seem to be less useful.  
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A Posteriori Logic Model 
The research results have informed the logic model describing whether the VBR tactics 
increased or decreased the metrics, and how the metrics were realized. The logic model was updated 
accordingly. The logic model also contains the most important themes identified in the analysis of the 
interviews. The final version of the logic model is presented in Figure 5. (The a priori logic model is in 
Figure 3.)  
Figure 5: A posteriori logic model (also in Appendix E) 
 
One of the most significant changes to the logic model was that most of the tactics have a 
potential impact on gain share.   
  
74 
 
Payer clinics did improve hospital care delivery, and the means by which they accomplished the 
improvement were consistent with a priori expectations. Payer clinics both increased and reduced the 
potential for earning a gain share, which was unexpected. They likely reduced medical expenses by 
slowing or preventing disease progression and by improving hospital care delivery, but they also 
introduced significant infrastructure costs which had to be covered before a gain share could occur.  
Capitation payments were received whether the PCP saw the patient or not, which incentivized 
PCPs to join the network. As more PCPs joined the network, this also grew membership, which was 
unanticipated in the a priori logic model.  
The tactic of new financial incentives, including gain sharing and incentives for care coordination 
with the Payer clinics, did not seem to have a major impact. This was likely because the gain share was 
not realized in 2015. This could change if the gain share is realized in a future period. The major themes 
about why the gain share was not realized were that membership was too low and infrastructure costs 
such as the Payer clinics and extensivists had to be covered first.  
Benefit design was originally anticipated to impact the gain share by improving patient health 
and reducing utilization of high cost services. This study also introduced the themes that membership 
and new patients served metrics improved through the benefit design. The benefits with the greatest 
impact were $0 premium, $0 copay and the extensivists. $0 premium brought in new members, some of 
which were new to the System. $0 copay at participating PCP clinics and the Payer clinics helped to 
incent in-network utilization, which helped to manage costs and ultimately improved the opportunity 
for gain share.  
Extensivists helped to improve hospital care delivery. Similar to the Payer clinics, the extensivists 
likely reduced medical expenses by slowing or preventing disease progression and by improving hospital 
care delivery, but they also introduced significant infrastructure costs which had to be covered before a 
gain share could occur. Therefore, they both increased and reduced the potential for a gain share. 
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A theme about the effective use of technology and data to improve hospital care delivery was 
reinforced by this study. Risk stratification to identify high risk patients emerged as a theme. Data 
included on reports helped with in-network utilization, membership, hospital care delivery, specialist 
referrals, Payer clinic visits, RAF scores, medical expenses and the medical loss ratio.  
Operating committee meetings did not seem to have a direct impact on metrics.  
A new marketing theme which emerged was an increase in the PCP network, via grassroots 
efforts to engage independent physicians. Membership was increased through marketing agents placed 
in or near doctors’ offices. The new patients served metric was not materially impacted by marketing, as 
thought in the a priori logic model.  
An external contextual factor which emerged was competition from other Medicare Advantage 
plans, particularly a $0 premium PPO plan offered in the County in 2015. An internal factor which arose 
was the relationship between the System and Payer, which was a positive factor for the most part.  
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CHAPTER 6: FEEDBACK, PLAN FOR CHANGE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 In this chapter, evaluative feedback to the System and Payer is first summarized. Next, a plan for 
change is described with the researcher’s role at AMGA in mind. Finally, policy implications are 
discussed.    
Feedback to the System and Payer 
This evaluation informs the System’s current VBR strategy and is of use in the System’s future 
VBR negotiations with insurance companies. It also provides feedback for the Payer. The researcher is 
not employed by the System or Payer. This is a benefit with regard to conducting the research as an 
objective outsider.  
Evaluating only the first year of the VBR partnership was perhaps too brief. The evaluation 
would have benefited from review of a longer duration of 2-3 years. The System and Payer are 
encouraged to conduct an ongoing evaluation of the partnership.  
Several recommendations for the System and Payer arose from the interviews and the literature 
review. The most important of these are as follows.  
1. The partnership will need to evolve and continuously assess whether each party’s needs are being 
met through the partnership. Though few new partnerships perform exactly as planned, some 
success has been achieved by the VBR partnership, and the relationship between the parties seems 
good.  Nonetheless, the partnership will need to evolve. Since 2014 when the strategic partnership 
was formed, the System has created a CIN and entered a Medicare ACO. The System has learned 
from the Payer and has learned from its own experiences in the CIN and ACO. Therefore, the System 
is in a different place than it was in 2014.  
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   The System should continue in its journey toward VBR. Some System key informants 
commented about needing to develop their own VBR infrastructure at some point and not being too 
dependent upon an insurance company. The two parties may not be completely in sync about this; 
the Payer seems to want the System to rely on it for VBR strategy and expertise. The two parties will 
need to periodically reassess what they want to gain from the VBR partnership, especially prior to 
contract renewal timeframes.  
2. More effort is needed to grow the VBR membership.  While one year was perhaps too short of a 
period to reach the initial membership goal, overall the number of members covered by the VBR 
partnership’s plan has been too small. System key informants commented that it was too much 
work for a small number of patients. Changes to the marketing tactic are likely needed in order to 
increase membership. The value of the VBR partnership’s plan needs to be made clearer to patients 
through improved marketing. Grass roots efforts may not be adequate to grow the number of 
members to the scale needed to generate a substantial gain share and to the scale desired by the 
System to feel that the amount of work involved in VBR is justified by the number of members.  
3. To grow membership, the parties should consider offering a Medicare Advantage PPO product in 
addition to the HMO.  In addition to the HMO product, a PPO product may widen the appeal and 
help membership to grow larger. Several interview comments were made about HMO products not 
being accepted in this market. A PPO product could bring in more patients to help spread fixed 
infrastructure costs over more people, while efforts continue to grow membership in the HMO plan. 
The narrow network seemed to adversely impact 2015 membership levels because of the limited 
number of providers in the network and only one hospital.   
4. The parties should re-evaluate the costs and benefits of the extensivists and Payer clinics as the 
network grows.  The VBR tactics – especially the Payer clinics, extensivists, and benefit design – 
seem beneficial with the potential to reduce cost, and should be offered to all patients, whether 
HMO or PPO. The Payer should consider how to maintain the high touch aspect of the extensivists as 
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the number of members increases; it may become more challenging to keep in touch with the high 
risk patients.  
5. Widen the communication “inner circle” to increase engagement.  Operating committee meetings 
should be continued, as they seem to be a good forum for communication. There seemed to be a 
trend among the key informants that those who were involved in the committee meetings were 
more knowledgeable about, and more supportive of, the VBR partnership. If there are opportunities 
to widen the “inner circle” and engage more people in the committee meetings, it may benefit the 
VBR partnership.   
6. Increase engagement by specialists and hospital leadership. There has been a focus on PCP 
engagement in the VBR partnership to date. Specialists and hospital leadership and management 
should become more engaged in the VBR partnership. Specialists can have a significant influence on 
the cost of care, especially via performance of procedures and prescribing patterns. Hospital 
management is crucial to the success of the VBR partnership, but has not benefited from the VBR 
partnership to date. It has been more of a System-level initiative. New incentives – financial or 
otherwise – may be needed for these two types of stakeholders to become more engaged in this 
VBR partnership.   
7. Improve communication from extensivists to other providers and Hospital/System 
representatives.  Some critical remarks were made by the System about how the extensivists 
control inpatient admissions (vs. observation status). The extensivists and the Payer should consider 
how they could improve communication with System representatives in order to increase 
understanding about their admission decisions. Also, a suggestion arose in the interviews about the 
need to work on extensivist relationships with specialists and improve communication between the 
extensivists and specialists.  
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Plan for Change with AMGA Members  
Separately from the feedback provided to the Payer and System, as summarized above, there 
are opportunities to further disseminate major themes learned from the literature review and from the 
research. The researcher’s work role is as Director of Translation for AMGA, a national medical group 
and health system member organization. In this role, she works closely with member organizations to 
provide coaching and support, including spreading best practices in population health and improving the 
uptake of relevant research. Subject to funding, AMGA periodically holds year-long learning 
collaboratives on specific topics. An AMGA learning collaborative focused on VBR will be a good venue 
for disseminating findings from this study, if funding can be obtained. AMGA’s learning collaborative 
framework is summarized in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: AMGA learning collaborative framework 
 
Learning collaboratives can be effective in improving quality in health care (IHI, 2003; Larson et 
al., 2018; Øvretveit et al., 2002; Tanenbaum, Cebul, Votruba & Einstadter, 2018; Ware et al., 2018; Wells 
et al., 2017). Øvretveit’s (2002) description of a learning collaborative is similar to AMGA’s approach:  
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A collaborative brings together groups of practitioners from different healthcare organisations to 
work in a structured way to improve one aspect of the quality of their service. It involves them in 
a series of meetings to learn about best practice in the area chosen, about quality methods and 
change ideas, and to share their experiences of making changes in their own local setting. (p. 
345) 
 
Applying Kotter’s eight steps of change (Kotter, 1996), the researcher’s proposed role in a 
potential VBR learning collaborative at AMGA (subject to funding) is described below. Teamwork is part 
of the AMGA culture; very little is done on one’s own. Depending on the scale of a VBR collaborative as 
well as the outcome of organizational decisions about how to handle the work, the researcher would 
lead some collaborative elements and participate in/contribute to others. It is difficult to know with 
certainty which elements the researcher would lead at this early conceptual stage.  
Establish a sense of urgency:  Regarding Kotter’s first step, establish a sense of urgency, 
organizations opt into AMGA learning collaboratives. Organizations desiring to participate must first 
submit an application, and a competitive review process follows. There will be a stipend paid to 
participating organizations ($10,000) to offset some of their participation costs, which is part of the 
reason why the process is competitive. Because organizations opt in, their leadership will already have 
decided that the VBR topic is a priority for them. However, some of the AMGA member representatives 
doing the work in a collaborative have been instructed to do it by their leadership, and they may need 
help to establish a sense of urgency within themselves or with others in the organization whose buy-in is 
important. For that reason, AMGA/the researcher will present at the initial in-person meeting and on 
the first webinar about the problem being focused on.  Chapter 1 of this document (Statement of the 
issue, Significance of the research, and Background) can be summarized and presented to help create a 
sense of urgency about VBR.  
Form a powerful guiding coalition: Kotter’s second step of change is to form a guiding coalition. 
AMGA/the researcher will assemble an Advisory committee (refer to Figure 6) of people with expertise 
in VBR, which could include representatives of the System and Payer, should they choose to be involved. 
Advisors receive a stipend for their services. In the early stages of planning a collaborative, the advisors 
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typically meet once in person as well as monthly by conference call/webinar format. AMGA/the 
researcher will plan the advisory committee meetings, set the agenda, facilitate discussion, and research 
questions and issues raised by the advisors.  
Participating organizations also form their own guiding coalition. Each organization is required 
to designate a project team, which AMGA/the researcher works closely with throughout a learning 
collaborative to provide coaching, help with problem solving, connect them to other AMGA members, 
answer questions, etc.  
Create a vision, communicate the vision, and empower others to act on the vision: Kotter’s 
steps 3, 4 and 5 will be addressed by AMGA/the researcher through four elements of AMGA’s 
framework: Outreach & coaching, In-person meetings, Site visits and Webinars.  During all of these 
interactions with AMGA members, AMGA/the researcher will coach the participating organizations’ 
project teams and their team leader. To initiate dialogue about a vision, the researcher will ask a 
provocative question, such as, “How do you think patients define the ‘value’ in value based 
reimbursement? And how far are you from delivering that value now?”  
For VBR, which has strong financial themes, the vision will not be limited to making more money 
for the organization. While this is likely one goal of a VBR initiative and it may motivate some 
organizational leaders, it will not inspire a large number of people. A better way to create a vision for 
VBR will be to tell patient stories. The patient stories will be about real patients (without using their 
names or other identifying information), and AMGA/the researcher will obtain the stories from 
collaborative participating organizations or the System and Payer, should they choose to participate in 
advisor roles. In the shift from “volume” to “value” which the U.S. healthcare system is undergoing, the 
“volume” stories will be similar to the status quo of traditional volume-based patient encounters. In 
contrast, the “value” stories will describe a more ideal care model where value is defined as high quality 
patient outcomes, high patient satisfaction, and optimized total cost of care, using innovative 
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approaches to care delivery such as the tactics in this VBR partnership (e.g., high risk clinics, home visits, 
free Uber/Lyft transportation to medical appointments).  
In addition to creating dialogue about a vision, the sub-topics summarized in Table 21 below, 
which arose from the literature review and the research, will be utilized for additional didactic material 
about VBR during Outreach & coaching, In-person meetings, Site visits and Webinars (see Figure 6). 
Plan for and create short-term wins: This is Kotter’s step 6. AMGA learning collaboratives 
typically include quarterly measures of improvement, represented by Measurement in Figure 6. 
Monitoring progress through data measurement is one way to identify short-term wins. AMGA/the 
researcher will also provide recognition for the highest performing organizations and most improved 
organizations at its Webinars and In-person meetings.  
The measures for this VBR collaborative will be similar to the System and Payer’s metrics. In 
particular, membership (number of covered lives), new patients served, and hospital care delivery are 
VBR metrics which can be measured quarterly with a goal of incremental growth. Also, patient 
satisfaction, physician satisfaction and average RAF score would be useful longer term annual metrics.  
AMGA/the researcher will provide measure specifications for its members to follow. The researcher or a 
data analyst will then compile the data into comparative benchmarking charts.  
Consolidate improvements and produce more change: This is Kotter’s step 7. AMGA 
collaborative participants will receive coaching about how to lead change management efforts at their 
organizations, and the researcher will help to lead the coaching. For example, at one “Analytics for 
Improvement” learning collaborative meeting, the researcher and a colleague co-presented an 
interactive session about how to lead change using Kotter’s framework. It is clear from the key 
informant interviews that VBR requires substantial organizational change, including changes by 
providers. Leadership of change management will be critical for each organization participating in the 
VBR learning collaborative.  
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Institutionalize new approaches: Kotter’s step 8 is about “stickiness” and sustainability. AMGA 
members include some of the largest health systems and medical groups in the country, including 
Kaiser, Cleveland Clinic, Mayo Clinic, Catholic Health Initiatives, and the newly merged Advocate-Aurora 
organization in Illinois and Wisconsin. Partially as a result of their size, AMGA member leaders tend to 
be systems thinkers, having to consider how to scale up successful innovations and make them part of 
standard workflow. At the closing In-person meeting of a learning collaborative, one or more speakers 
will talk about success stories and strategies for sustainability. Also, AMGA/the researcher, with 
guidance from the Advisory committee, will coach the project teams about VBR scale-up and 
sustainability during monthly conference calls for Outreach & coaching, Site visits, Webinars, and other 
interactions with members.  
Confidentiality and blinding is in place per agreements with the System and Payer. This research 
provides a case study of a VBR partnership with several themes for AMGA organizations to consider.  
These lessons can be shared with AMGA member organizations at a high level - without sharing 
confidential information and while maintaining blinding - through the researcher’s translation role. In 
addition to the potential VBR learning collaborative, the researcher will apply and disseminate learnings 
from this research in her many interactions with AMGA members. VBR and Medicare Advantage are hot 
topics for AMGA members. Table 21 lists high level takeaways about VBR which are suitable for 
dissemination and coaching during site visits, conference calls, webinars, seminars and conferences, 
while still preserving confidentiality for the Payer and System. VBR is a topic that can be “layered onto” 
chronic disease quality improvement initiatives which AMGA/the researcher work on with members.  
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Table 21: VBR topics for AMGA dissemination 
 
Topic Summary 
Logic model The a posteriori logic model in Figure 5 provides a framework which can be 
applied to other VBR arrangements.   
Impactful tactics High risk clinics and extensivists (or hospitalists) were found in the literature 
review as well as in this project. The pros and cons of putting higher 
impact/higher cost tactics like these in place are important to consider in VBR 
arrangements and would be an important topic for AMGA members.  
VBR financial 
incentives 
The literature review found extensive information about VBR financial 
incentives. A summary of this information will assist AMGA members in their 
VBR negotiations and decisions.   
Timeframes Adequate ramp-up time should be factored into new VBR models in order to 
attract payers and health systems to those new models, and to provide the best 
possible opportunity for their success. It took time for a new venture like this to 
operate effectively and for providers to learn new competencies. Payer 
representatives noted that it took time for patients’ conditions to be fully 
documented so that they would be factored into the RAF score, to permit 
appropriate reimbursement from CMS to the Payer.  
 
Future innovative payment models should try to balance a short term need for 
minimizing downside risk while learning about VBR, with a long term goal of 
growing VBR infrastructure. 
HMO vs. PPO While many payers have a national presence and a national perspective, 
healthcare organizations like those in AMGA are closely tied to the communities 
they serve. AMGA members should investigate their market’s willingness to 
accept HMO plans before entering risk arrangements with HMO plans. 
Advantages other 
than what the 
metrics reflect 
Entering the VBR arrangement was felt to provide a boost in building a clinically 
integrated network, a competitive advantage, improved ambulatory access, and 
learning about VBR risk stratification, population health, and HCC coding/RAF 
scores. 
Pros and cons of a 
payer-health 
system 
partnership 
Insurance companies like the Payer bring relevant experience and expertise. In 
this case, the Payer was also willing to take downside risk. On the other hand, in 
a partnership like this one, the transfer of knowledge does not completely occur 
from an insurance company to a health system. These are important 
considerations for AMGA member organizations. 
 
 Policy Implications 
 There are three policy implications of this research for federal policymakers:  
• Federal policies should be considered to require improved transparency of data, including claims 
data, between payers and health systems with common beneficiaries and patients. 
• If Medicare Advantage plans can demonstrate superior patient outcomes and ultimately lower 
the cost of care, then federal funding to Medicare Advantage plans should not be reduced. 
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Medicare Advantage shows promise because of innovations which strategic partnerships like 
this one have begun, with the potential to ultimately reduce healthcare costs.  
• The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation should consider testing payment models 
which pay primary care providers via capitation to determine if it results in improved 
approaches to treating traditional Medicare patients. 
Payers want to protect their proprietary knowledge base, which is a reasonable goal. Payers also 
possess claims data that many health systems lack. At AMGA, members have complained about Payers 
withholding claims data from them. As noted in this study, technology and data is an important tactic to 
monitor health service utilization and manage the cost of care. Federal policies should be considered to 
require improved transparency of data, including claims data, between payers and health systems 
with common beneficiaries and patients.  
 The flexibility which Medicare Advantage plans have to offer different benefits and 
interventions than traditional Medicare was a positive in this scenario. The benefits were described 
positively by key informants. As noted in Chapter 1, the way that Medicare Advantage plans are paid 
PMPM by CMS creates greater incentives to reduce the volume of services through innovation (Ayanian 
et al., 2013; CMS, 2016; MedPAC, 2016). However, Medicare Advantage plans cost the U.S. government 
more than traditional Medicare. Federal reductions in funding for Medicare Advantage plans are 
proposed from time to time, which may threaten the viability of some of these plans, forcing some plans 
out, and potentially losing the innovations which exist. If Medicare Advantage plans can demonstrate 
superior patient outcomes and ultimately lower the cost of care, Medicare Advantage funding should 
not be reduced.   
VBR arrangements like this one have incentives to identify high risk patients and intervene 
proactively with them to delay or prevent disease progression and hospitalization. Traditional payment 
arrangements often do not provide such incentives. Capitation provides a revenue stream while 
providers and health systems can explore new approaches to treating patients. This theme arose during 
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the key informant interviews and was also present in the literature review (Tanio & Chen, 2013). 
Capitation has been present in some commercial insurance, some Medicaid plans, and some Medicare 
Advantage plans, but it has not been an option for traditional Medicare reimbursement outside of 
innovation projects or ACOs. Future Medicare VBR payment mechanisms may want to make increased 
use of capitation. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) should consider testing 
payment models which pay primary care providers via capitation to determine if this indeed results in 
improved approaches to treating traditional Medicare patients, with a goal of delivering higher quality 
at lower costs. Such capitated payment models are most likely to be attractive to integrated health 
delivery systems with a large number of lives to manage; organizations should not be required to accept 
capitation. If a CMMI test is successful, such a capitated payment model should be considered for 
addition to the list of CMS-approved Advanced Alternative Payment Model under MACRA, which would 
enable organizations like the System to earn a 5% incentive while meeting regulatory requirements to 
engage in VBR (114th Congress, 2015; CMS, 2018). 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT 
 
Accountable care organization (ACO) - A collection of physicians and hospitals which take risk related to 
cost and quality to have an opportunity to share in savings (Casto & Forrestal, 2013) 
Capitation – A fixed per member, per month payment from an insurance company to a primary care 
provider, intended to cover the provider’s cost of care for assigned patients. Typically occurs in HMOs. 
Clinical Integration Network or Clinically Integrated Network (CIN) – A group of health care providers 
linked together by contract and often affiliated with a health system. The network may include both 
independent and employed health care providers. Members of the network are typically incentivized 
toward common quality and cost of care goals. (Strilesky, 2012) 
Extensivist – A physician who cares for highly complex patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or acute 
conditions) in a clinic and/or inpatient setting 
Fee-for-service - Reimbursement from an insurance company to a healthcare provider to compensate 
for the volume of services rendered   
Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC) – Part of a risk adjustment model used by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, HCC conditions generate a Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) score which 
attempts to account for patient illness in calculating reimbursement. (CMS, 2017) 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) – A type of health insurance plan which typically requires 
beneficiaries to go through a primary care provider before seeking care from specialists, and typically 
restricts the use of out-of-network providers and facilities through higher co-pays and deductibles or 
non-payment for out-of-network services 
High risk clinic – An outpatient doctors’ office or hospital outpatient setting to care for highly complex 
patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or acute conditions) 
Leakage – In healthcare insurance, the term leakage is sometimes used to refer to the use of out-of-
network facilities or providers.  
Lean – A popular continuous improvement approach which draws on primarily Japanese manufacturing 
methods to reduce waste in processes and improve efficiency, quality and safety (Bielaszka-DuVernay, 
2011a; “Critical path network: interdisciplinary initiative”, 2009) 
Medical home – Also called “patient centered medical home”; a formal type of care model wherein 
patients are attributed to a primary care provider and receive coordinated care; often certified by an 
accrediting body (examples of accrediting bodies: National Committee for Quality Assurance, American 
Academy of Family Physicians) 
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) – A percentage of insurance company funds which are expended on patient 
care   
Medicare Advantage – Privatized Medicare insurance for Americans age 65 and above, typically 
provided by commercial insurance companies which enter into contracts with the federal government 
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to provide such insurance. The latter are also called Medicare Advantage Organizations. Benefits and 
cost may vary from Medicare. Also called Medicare Part C. Formerly called Medicare+Choice. 
Nursing care management – This term covers a range of services typically delivered by nurses or medical 
assistants which are intended to coordinate and communicate primary and specialty care between clinic 
visits, in a proactive manner. Also referred to as coordination of care.  
Outcomes based reimbursement (or outcomes based payment or purchasing) – Synonym for Value based 
reimbursement – see definition for Value based reimbursement 
Risk Adjustment Factor (RAF) – Primarily used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, RAF is 
a method of adapting reimbursement to account for the number and severity of patient diseases or 
conditions. (CMS, 2017)   
Star ratings - Star ratings are standardized insurance plan scores, ranging from 1-5 stars, with 1 being a 
poor score and 5 being the best score 
Telemonitoring or telemedicine (For the purposes of this dissertation, these terms are used 
interchangeably. The use of equipment and electronic information signals (usually via computer or 
telephone) to obtain information about patients who are at other locations, most often home or 
hospital.  
Transitions of care – Typically refers to the processes involved in a patient’s move from an inpatient 
setting to home in order to lessen the chance of a readmission. Processes often include scheduling of a 
clinic appointment to occur post-discharge, medication reconciliation, home visit and environmental 
assessment, and patient and caregiver education.  
Value based reimbursement (or value based payment or purchasing) (“VBR”) – Third party 
reimbursement based at least in part on patient outcomes, performance of specified quality measures, 
and/or the cost of care. Typically includes risk of a reduction in reimbursement. 
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APPENDIX B: PRE-INTERVIEW BRIEFING SHEET 
(redacted to exclude confidential names of the Payer and System) 
Introduction: I’m Jill Powelson, a doctoral student working on my dissertation at the University of North 
Carolina Gillings Global School of Public Health (UNC SPH). I have had a 30 year career in healthcare 
including operations leadership, quality improvement, and nursing. I’m currently the Director of Clinical 
Translation for the American Medical Group Association (AMGA).  
Background: As you know, the System is a strategic partner with the Payer and they have introduced a 
Medicare Advantage product in _____ County with some elements of value based reimbursement 
(VBR). The System and Payer are interested in evaluating the effect of the new partnership upon 
System, and both organizations are actively cooperating in the research.  
Therefore, when we talk during the interview, I hope that you will feel comfortable speaking freely.  
Interviews: Our collective goal is to evaluate the effect of the Payer VBR strategic partnership upon 
System. We will discuss several metrics about the first year of operations under this contract at System, 
including hospital utilization. These interviews will further explore the “how and why” of the effects 
we’re seeing. You have been identified by System or Payer as someone whose input would be beneficial 
for the interviews.  
My preference would be to tape record our interview so that I can have complete notes. At the 
beginning of the interview, I will ask your consent to record.  
Payer VBR tactics:  
The following have been identified by System and Payer as major tactics of their arrangement. During 
the interview, I will ask whether you think this is a complete list, as well as how you think these tactics 
might influence the metrics shown below.  
• Payer-run high risk clinics 
• Payer-employed extensivists 
• Effective use of technology and data  
• Primary care capitation and monthly operating committees 
• New financial incentives 
• Complementary benefit designs to support the clinical model 
• Marketing/word of mouth referrals, and other grass roots efforts with brokers and community 
leaders 
 
  
  
  
90 
 
Metrics for Payer VBR contract:  
Metric 2015 Goals Description Outcomes 
New patients 
served 
Significant % of 
members are 
“new to 
SYSTEM” 
Significant % of Payer members 
are “new to System”, meaning 
they haven’t had a visit to 
System in the 18 months prior to 
becoming an Payer member 
Exceeded goal 
PCP network 
composition 
Significant % of 
network PCPs 
are 
independent 
PCPs 
Gain participation from 
independent PCPs to (1) build 
relationships with those PCPs 
with the goal of involving them 
with other value based care 
programs and (2) ensure a 
broader network across the 
County to drive PCP access and 
improve attractiveness of the 
product 
Did not meet goal  
Joint collaboration on provider outreach 
between System and Payer also had a 
positive impact on System’s Clinically 
Integrated Network contracting efforts. 
Membership x members Achieve annual membership goal Did not meet goal  
Shared responsibility of Payer, other 
insurer8 and System 
Gain share 
Payer 
N/A Create gain shares with the PCPs 
and Hospital, allowing them to 
participate in the benefits from 
practicing value based care over 
time 
Gain share in place; no money was 
distributed in 2015  
 
 
2015 FFS Benchmarks 
(Regional)  
@ 1.0 Risk Score 
Payer 2015 Performance*  
Inpatient Admits per 1,000 Patients 236 Lower than benchmark 
Inpatient Average Length of Stay 5.3 Lower than benchmark** 
Inpatient Readmission Rate % 16.1%*** Lower than benchmark 
*Based on 2015 dates of service claims data  
**1 Hospital where Payer had the ability to influence hospitalist processes and inpatient LOS 
***Data based on all 2015 FFS & Medicare Advantage Data; not risk adjusted 
 
During our interview, I will ask for your thoughts and insights about the above metrics.  
  
                                                          
8 Other insurer is delegated for Sales and Marketing in the County on behalf of the partnership. 
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Plan benefits:  
The following benefits were offered by the VBR plan in 2015. I will ask if you were aware of these 
benefits and whether you believe any of these benefits contributed to the metrics (shown just above) or 
created value in some other way.     
• Ride program 
• Drug benefit 
• 0 premium 
• 0 copay for PCP/Payer Care Centers 
• Home monitoring (Vivify System with video conferencing) 
• Dental benefit 
• Vision benefit 
• Nutrition/podiatry benefit (in house nutritionist/podiatry) 
• Jump Start 
• Extensivist Care Model 
Confidentiality: UNC SPH has confidentiality agreements in place with System and Payer under which 
this research will be conducted. I am covered under this agreement as a student of UNC SPH. Payer 
retains rights to its confidential information under these agreements and will review the resulting 
dissertation document to ensure that confidential information is appropriately protected.  
System and Payer will be blinded (the organizational names/locations will not be shown) in the resulting 
dissertation document, at their request.  
I will provide a complete list of interview questions to you in advance.  
Thank you for your consideration. My contact information is provided below, should you need to 
contact me before or after the interview.  
Best wishes, 
 
Jill Powelson 
E-mail powelson@ad.unc.edu 
Mobile (901) 786-3410 
 
George H. Pink, PhD 
Chair, Dissertation Committee 
Email: gpink@ad.unc.edu  
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
(redacted to exclude confidential names of the Payer and System) 
Section 1: Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to understand the first year metrics and outcomes of a new Value 
Based Reimbursement (VBR) arrangement (a health insurance contract and strategic partnership) 
between System and Payer and to explore how they occurred. This research is being conducted as 
part of my doctoral dissertation in public health leadership at the Gillings School of Global Public 
Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
You have been identified by either System or Payer as a key informant appropriate to participate in 
interviews. You should have also received a briefing sheet via advance e-mail.  
This interview is intended to: 
• Review the impact of the new VBR arrangement with you, and 
• Ask for your knowledge and opinions about how the impact occurred.  
 
The interview should take about 1 hour. Your responses will be treated confidentially and the findings 
will be reported anonymously. I would greatly appreciate a recording of this interview for analysis 
purposes.  The recording will be deleted after I complete my analysis, and no comments will be 
directly attributed back to you unless I specifically obtain your consent, in advance, to do so. 
• Do you have any questions about the research study or the interview?  (If so, pause and 
review the briefing sheet and any questions they may have.) 
• Do you consent to be interviewed? 
• May I record this interview? (Then ask the 2nd and 3rd questions again after pressing Record.) 
 
Section 2: Background  
Q1. What is your role in the organization? 
Follow-up questions: What is your job title? How long have you been in this role?   
Section 3: General information on VBR arrangement 
Q2. What is your current involvement in the VBR arrangement? 
Follow-up questions: If a provider, do you know how many (or what proportion of) Payer patients you 
have? 
Q3. Are you familiar with the financial incentives tied to the VBR arrangement, such as gain sharing?  
Follow-up questions: Do the financial incentives impact you?  
Q4. (For System) Did you make any changes at your organization (or if a provider, in your practice) as 
a direct result of the VBR arrangement? 
Follow-up questions: New programs or services, new hires, new committees, new metrics or reports? 
Did it have any impact on your clinic capacity? 
Section 4:  Payer VBR tactics 
Q5. Reflecting again on the briefing sheet, VBR tactics used in this arrangement are listed there:  
• Payer-run high risk clinics 
• Payer-employed Extensivists 
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• Effective use of technology and data  
• Primary care capitation and monthly operating committees 
• New financial incentives 
• Complementary benefit designs to support the clinical model 
• Marketing/word of mouth referrals, and other grass roots efforts with brokers and 
community leaders 
What are your thoughts about the completeness of this list of tactics?  
Follow-up questions: Is anything missing – is there a tactic being used that I do not have listed? Should 
any of these be removed? 
Section 5: Assessing the first year metrics 
Q6. Do you think that VBR tactics contributed to the first year performance on these metrics?  
Follow-up questions: Where did they exceed, fall short or meet expectations? 
Q6a. If answer to Q6 is yes: Which VBR tactics do you think had the greatest impact on the first year 
performance?  (see list in Q5)  
Follow-up questions: Which were the driving force of the changes? For example, how important were 
the financial incentives? 
Q6b. If answer to Q6 is yes: How do you think the VBR tactics achieved the metrics?   
Follow-up questions: Do you have any further thoughts about how the results were achieved?  
Q7: Did the VBR tactics create value in other ways not shown by the metrics? 
Follow-up questions: Did they change care or other processes for non-Payer patients, including at the 
Hospital? 
Section 6: Plan benefits 
Q8. The briefing sheet includes plan benefits offered in 2015:  
• Ride program 
• Drug benefit 
• 0 premium 
• 0 copay for PCP/Payer Care Centers 
• Home monitoring (with video conferencing) 
• Dental benefit 
• Vision benefit 
• Nutrition/podiatry benefit (in house nutritionist/podiatry) 
• Initial medical and psychosocial assessments 
• Extensivist Care Model 
Were you previously aware of these benefits?  
Q9. Do you believe that any of these benefits contributed to the first year performance on the metrics 
on the briefing sheet?   
Follow-up questions: For physicians: Did you get feedback from the patients on any of these benefits? 
Did you believe it affected their satisfaction? 
Q9a. If answer to Q9 is yes: Which ones?   
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Follow-up questions: In your opinion, were any of these more important than the others in achieving 
the metrics? 
Q9b. If answer to Q9 is yes: Why do you think these benefits impacted the 1st year performance 
metrics? 
Q10. Did the benefits create value in other ways not shown by the metrics? 
Section 7: Differences 
Q11. How do you think the health of the patients covered by this specific Medicare Advantage 
insurance plan compares to other Medicare or Medicare Advantage patients?  
Follow-up questions: Can you elaborate? 
Section 8: Conclusions and wrap-up 
Q12. What other explanations may exist for the first year performance shown in the metrics?  
Q13. Do you expect to see different financial metrics for the 2nd full year (calendar year 2016)?  If so, 
what do you expect to see?  
Follow-up questions: Do you think that the 2015 results are sustainable? Do you think that some part 
of the expected change in the 2nd year (CY2016) could be due to VBR?  
Q14. How does the partnership with Payer fit into System’s overall VBR strategy? 
Follow-up questions: Does it advance their strategy? How?  
Q15. Overall, do you think that the VBR arrangement was advantageous to System in 2015?  
Follow-up questions: Why or why not?  
Q16. Are you aware of any changes planned for the VBR arrangement, or changes in its major tactics?  
Follow-up questions: Would you like to suggest any changes to the VBR arrangement? If so, what? 
Q17. Is there anything else that you would like to share with us regarding the VBR arrangement?  
Follow-up questions: Is there anything else that I should have asked? Are there other results about the 
VBR arrangement that I should review?  
####  
Thank you very much for your participation. If you are interested, I would be pleased to share the 
results of my research when the final report has been approved for sharing.  
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APPENDIX D: A PRIORI LOGIC MODEL 
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APPENDIX E: A POSTERIORI LOGIC MODEL 
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APPENDIX F: CODING FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Code 
Groups 
Code Explanation of code 
Benefits Benefit 0 Copay Benefit: zero copay for visits to PCPs and Payer clinics 
Benefits Benefit 0 Premium 
Benefit: zero monthly premium for Part C, Medicare 
Advantage 
Benefits Benefit Assessment 
Benefit: an initial thorough medical and psychosocial 
assessment for new plan members. The service has a 
brand name, but it is not shown here because of 
blinding. 
Benefits Benefit Dental Benefit: dental coverage 
Benefits Benefit Drugs Benefit: drug benefits, including $0 for generic drugs 
Benefits Benefit Extensivists 
Benefit: extensivist professional services, at no 
charge. An extensivist is a physician who cares for 
highly complex patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or 
acute conditions) in a clinic and/or inpatient setting.  
Benefits Benefit General/Unspecified 
Pertaining to plan benefits generally; not specific to a 
particular benefit 
Benefits Benefit Home Monitor 
Benefit: wireless home monitoring, for certain 
patients at high risk of readmission 
Benefits Benefit Nutrition 
Benefit: services provided by a nutritionist at the 
Payer clinics 
Benefits Benefit Other 
Benefits other than those on the pre-interview 
briefing sheet, such as low maximum out of pocket 
(MOOP), or 0 copay for urgent care 
Benefits Benefit Podiatry/Manicurist 
Benefit: podiatry or medical manicurist services, 
provided at the Payer clinics 
Benefits Benefit Rides 
Benefit: Uber/Lyft transportation to medical 
appointments, to the pharmacy, and other medically 
oriented trips 
Benefits Benefit Vision Benefit: glasses and frames 
Benefits Benefit: - comment A negative comment about one of the benefits 
Benefits Benefit: + comment A positive comment about one of the benefits 
Benefits Benefit: greatest impact 
Designating one or more benefits as having the 
greatest impact on the 2015 Metrics 
Benefits Benefit: how worked 
Providing insight about how the benefit worked, 
particularly how it affected the 2015 Metrics 
Benefits Benefit: missing benefit A benefit was noted as missing from the benefit list 
Benefits Benefit: unaware 
The interviewee was unaware of one or more 
benefits 
Metrics Metric Admits 
Metric: inpatient Payer admits per 1,000 patients at 
System Hospital, compared with same year fee-for-
service benchmarks @ 1.0 risk score 
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Code 
Groups 
Code Explanation of code 
Metrics Metric ALOS 
Metric: inpatient Payer average length of stay at 
System Hospital, compared with same year fee-for-
service benchmarks @ 1.0 risk score 
Metrics Metric Gain Share 
Metric: a percentage of the profit (or excess revenue 
after expenses are deducted) from the VBR 
arrangement 
Metrics Metric Member Count Metric: number of members enrolled in Payer plan 
Metrics Metric New Patients 
Metric: proportion of patients who are enrolled in 
Payer plan and new to the System (New=have not 
had a visit to the System in the 18 months prior to 
becoming a plan member) 
Metrics Metric PCP Network 
Metric: proportion of Primary Care Providers (PCPs) 
who are independent vs. employed by System 
Metrics Metric Readmits 
Metric: inpatient Payer readmissions at System 
Hospital, compared with same year fee-for-service 
benchmarks @ 1.0 risk score 
Metrics Metric: - comment A positive comment about one of the metrics 
Metrics Metric: + comment A negative comment about one of the metrics 
Metrics Metric: changes A metric result has changed since 2015 
Metrics Metric: missing 
A metric was noted as missing from the list included 
in the pre-interview briefing sheet 
Metrics Metric: no changes A metric result has not changed since 2015 
Metrics Metric: other explanations 
There are other explanations for the metric's 
performance, apart from the VBR tactics 
Partnership Advantageous to System: No 
The VBR partnership has not been advantageous for 
the System 
Partnership 
Advantageous to System: 
Other 
Other comment about the VBR partnership being 
advantageous or not for the System 
Partnership Advantageous to System: Yes 
The VBR partnership has been advantageous for the 
System 
Partnership Payer as partner + comment 
A positive comment about Payer as a partner in the 
VBR arrangement 
Partnership System as partner + comment 
A positive comment about System as a partner in the 
VBR arrangement 
Partnership 
System didnt make 
changes/not aware of changes 
The System did not make any operational changes 
because of the VBR partnership, or the interviewee 
was not aware of any such changes 
Partnership 
System made changes bc of 
partnership 
The System made operational changes because of 
the VBR partnership 
Partnership 
System made changes but not 
bc of partnership 
The System made operational changes but not 
because of the VBR partnership 
Partnership Why entered partnership 
A comment about why the System or Payer entered 
the VBR partnership 
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Code 
Groups 
Code Explanation of code 
Tactics Tactic Benefit Design 
VBR tactic: complementary benefit designs to 
support the clinical model 
Tactics Tactic Capitation 
VBR tactic: primary care capitation payments (per 
member, per month payments) 
Tactics Tactic Care Centers 
VBR tactic: Payer clinics in the County providing initial 
assessments of medical and psychosocial needs, and 
ongoing care for high risk patients. Staffed by 
Extensivists and multi-disciplinary care team.  
Tactics Tactic Extensivists 
VBR tactic: extensivist professional services, at no 
charge. An extensivist is a physician who cares for 
highly complex patients (i.e., with multiple chronic or 
acute conditions) in a clinic and/or inpatient setting. 
(also see Benefit Extensivists) 
Tactics Tactic General/Unspecified 
VBR tactic: pertaining to tactics generally, not to a 
specific tactic 
Tactics Tactic Incentives 
VBR tactic: financial incentives including Gain Share 
and fees for coordination with Payer clinics. Note 
that Capitation payments are in a separate tactic.  
Tactics Tactic Marketing 
VBR tactic: marketing and word of mouth referrals, 
and other grass roots efforts with brokers and 
community leaders 
Tactics Tactic Mo Oper Comm 
VBR tactic: monthly operating committee meetings 
with representatives from Payer and System 
Tactics Tactic Other 
VBR tactic: pertaining to a tactic which was not 
included on the tactic list in the pre-interview briefing 
sheet 
Tactics Tactic Technology/Data 
VBR tactic: effective use of technology and data, 
including Payer command center/data stack, shared 
electronic health record, predictive modeling 
algorithms, enterprise data warehouse, reports and 
report cards 
Tactics 
Tactic: - comment or needs 
improve 
VBR tactic: a negative comment was made, or a 
suggestion for improvement 
Tactics Tactic: + comment VBR tactic: a positive comment was made 
Tactics Tactic: greatest impact 
VBR tactic: one or more tactics were noted as having 
the greatest impact on metrics  
Tactics Tactic: how worked 
VBR tactic: an interviewee described how a tactic 
worked, particularly how a tactic worked to achieve 
one or more metrics 
Tactics Tactic: late or slow VBR tactic: a tactic was put into place late or slowly 
Tactics Tactic: missing tactic 
VBR tactic: a tactic was missing from the list provided 
in the pre-interview briefing sheet 
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Code 
Groups 
Code Explanation of code 
Tactics Tactic: unaware 
VBR tactic: the interviewee was unaware of one or 
more tactics  
  Building CIN 
Pertaining to the building of a Clinically Integrated 
Network by the System 
  Coding 
Pertaining to professional coding, particularly of 
diagnosis codes but also procedural codes 
  Communication 
Pertaining to communication between two or more 
parties 
  Coordinate/Collaborate 
Pertaining to coordination and/or collaboration 
between two or more parties 
  Cost of care Pertaining to the cost of care  
  Create value: no 
Answered no to question about whether the benefits 
or tactics create value in ways not shown by the 
metrics 
  Create value: uncertain 
Answer uncertain to question about whether the 
benefits or tactics create value in ways not shown by 
the metrics 
  Create value: yes 
Answer yes to question about whether the benefits 
or tactics create value in ways not shown by the 
metrics 
  Engage/Relationship Pertaining to engagement or relationships 
  Financial impacts me Financial incentives impact the interviewee 
  Future period Pertaining to a period of time after 2015 ended 
  HMO 
Pertaining to a Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) 
  Improve clinical outcomes 
About improving/improvement of clinical outcomes 
or quality 
  Learn: no No learning occurred via the VBR arrangement 
  Learn: yes Yes learning occurred via the VBR arrangement 
  Market share Pertaining to market share 
  Network Pertaining to a provider network 
  Not impactful 
This qualifier could be applied to a benefit or tactic to 
designate that it did not impact the metrics 
  Other 
A catch-all code for important but miscellaneous 
information 
  Problem A problem or complaint  
  Quotable Quote 
A quotation that is interesting, to the point, highly 
representative, or memorable 
  Risk stratification 
Pertaining to the grouping of patients by their 
predicted future risk of needing inpatient care, or risk 
of progressing in a disease state  
  Strategy 
Pertaining to a strategy, or the VBR arrangement 
broadly 
  
101 
 
Code 
Groups 
Code Explanation of code 
  Suggestion Suggestions for improvement in the future 
  These Patients less sick 
Payer patients are less sick than other Medicare or 
Medicare Advantage patients 
  
These Patients not 
sicker/similar to others 
Payer patients are similar in their health to other 
Medicare or Medicare Advantage patients 
  
These Patients sick level: 
other 
Other comment about the health level of Payer 
patients compared with Medicare or Medicare 
Advantage patients 
  These Patients sicker 
Payer patients are sicker than other Medicare or 
Medicare Advantage patients 
  Turnover A comment about staff or leadership changes 
  Why didn't work 
Interviewee comment about why a tactic or benefit 
did not work to improve the metrics 
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